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Countries who adopted regulation of coal-fired power plants after 1980 generally did so at a much
lower level of per-capita income than did early adopters – poor countries regulated sooner. This phenomenon
suggests that pioneering adopters of environmental regulation provide an advantage to countries adopting
these regulations later, presumably through advances in technology made by these first adopters. Focusing
specifically on regulation of coal-fired power plants, we ask to what extent the availability of new
technology influences the adoption of new environmental regulation. We build a general equilibrium
model of an open economy to identify the political-economy determinants of the decision to regulate
emissions. Using a newly-created data set of SO2 and NOX regulations for coal-fired power plants
and a patent-based measure of the technology frontier, we test the model’s predictions using a hazard
regression of the diffusion of environmental regulation across countries. Our findings support the hypothesis
that international economic integration eases access to environmentally friendly technologies and leads
to earlier adoption, ceteris paribus, of regulation in developing countries. By limiting firms’ ability
to burden shift, however, openness may raise opposition to regulation. Our results suggest that domestic
trade protection allows costs to be shifted to domestic consumers while large countries can shift costs
to foreign consumers, raising the likelihood of adoption. Other political economy factors, such as the
quality of domestic coal and election years, are also important determinants.
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dcpopp@maxwell.syr.edu  With mounting environmental costs of economic growth, the world looks to technology 
for an exit ramp from what seems to be a crash course to ecological disaster. Indeed, China, a 
prominent example of break-neck growth amid rising domestic damage, recently held its first 
national conference on technology and the environment, declaring scientific innovation the key 
to “historic transformation of environmental protection” and “leap-frog development.”
1,2 For 
China and other rapidly growing countries, technology seems to offer a panacea for the 
environmental problems accompanying their economic development.  
If technology is a panacea, it is not a costless one.  Installation and use of pollution-
control technologies are costly and these technologies are rarely adopted without regulatory 
stimulus.
3  Thus, to understand the diffusion of costly pollution-control technologies, we need to 
understand the diffusion of regulation.  In this paper, we examine the diffusion across countries 
of coal-fired power plant regulation.  Not only is the diffusion of power plant regulation 
important in its own right, given the rapid construction of these plants across the developing 
world, its study illuminates the determinants of regulation adoption and thus offers useful lessons 
for promoting diffusion of other emission-control technologies.  
The research question is motivated by two observations.  First, the diffusion of air 
pollution-control technologies is strongly linked to changes in regulatory pressure.  For example, 
most power plants in China have controls for particulate matter (PM), while only the newest 
plants control nitrogen oxides (NOX) and sulfur dioxide (SO2).  This sequence reflects the earlier 
appearance in China of PM regulations than of NOX and SO2 controls.
4  Second, despite 
                                                 
1 For a description of the environmental costs of growth in China, see World Bank (2001). 
2 For a brief overview of the National Conference on Environmental Science and Technology, held August 18-19, 
2006, see State Environmental Protection Agency (2007). 
3 Studies supporting the importance of regulation for diffusion of environmental technologies include Gray and 
Shadbegian (1998), Kerr and Newell (2003), Snyder et al. (2003), and Popp (2006b). 
4 Data are taken from the CoalPower 4 database, the International Energy Agency (IEA) Coal Research Programme. 2 
predictions of the environmental Kuznets curve literature, which suggests an inverted-U   
relationship between environmental performance and economic growth, countries who adopted 
regulation of coal-fired power plants after 1980 generally did so at a much lower level of per-
capita income than did early adopters – poor countries regulated sooner. This phenomenon 
suggests that early adopters of environmental regulation provide an advantage to countries 
adopting these regulations later, presumably through advances in technology made by these 
pioneering adopters.   
We attempt to understand why poorer countries adopt sooner, focusing on the link 
between the global technological frontier and environmental regulation. Environmental controls 
in advanced economies are likely to induce new innovations needed to comply with regulation.  
However, for other countries, the technologies needed to comply with regulations are already in 
use elsewhere in the world when the decision to regulate is made.  Thus, in this paper, rather than 
asking to what extent environmental regulation induces new environmental innovation, as in 
previous studies of early adopters, we instead ask to what extent the availability of new 
technology influences the adoption of environmental regulation by non-innovating countries.
5   
Our approach considers carefully the role of international markets and trade policies in 
transmitting both knowledge and cost shocks across economies.  Previous studies suggest that 
access to international markets influences firms’ ability to use new technology. Reppelin-Hill 
(1999) finds that adoption of new technology in the steel industry is positively correlated with 
trade openness.  Acharya and Keller (2007) estimate that the contribution of international 
technology transfer to productivity growth exceeds that of domestic R&D and that imports are a 
                                                 
5 In recent years, several papers have studied the potential for environmental policy to induce environmentally-
friendly innovation.  Nearly all of these studies have focused on highly developed economies.  This is not surprising, 
as these countries were the first to enact environmental protections and most R&D expenditures occur in these 
countries.  In 2000, global R&D expenditures were at least $729 billion.  82 percent of this was done in the OECD 
and half was performed by the United States and Japan alone (National Science Board, 2006).   3 
major channel for these spillovers.  Consequently, we investigate the possibility that low trade 
barriers ease access to new technology, and thus increase the likelihood of domestic regulation. 
We acknowledge the double-edged nature of openness, however, in that the global 
market constrains domestic firms’ ability to pass along higher abatement costs.  To the extent 
that local firms are protected from such competition through trade restrictions, their ability to 
shift the regulatory burden to domestic consumers may be larger and their opposition to 
regulation lessened.  We also consider the size of the domestic economy relative to the world 
market, reflecting the ability of local producers to pass costs through to foreign consumers.  
To focus directly on the decision to adopt pollution control regulations, we constructed a 
data base of coal-fired power plant regulation for SO2 and NOX across 45 countries.  For each 
country, we identify the year in which these regulations were first enacted.  Using the history of 
these particular regulations allows us to focus on a specific set of explanatory variables important 
to coal-fired plants and permits us to identify political economy concerns more precisely than if a 
broad index of regulation were used.  Narrowing our study to a specific set of regulations also 
allows us to more precisely define the relevant technological frontier.  We measure innovation 
using patents on pollution control devices specific to the reduction of SO2 and NOX emissions. 
We begin with a general equilibrium model of an open economy and we analyze the 
political economy decision to regulate emissions.  From this, we develop several empirical 
predictions that we examine using our panel of regulation data.  Our findings support the 
hypothesis that international economic integration eases access to environmentally friendly 
technologies and leads to earlier adoption, ceteris paribus, of regulation in developing countries.  
Our results are also consistent with the view that domestic trade protection allows costs to be 
shifted to domestic consumers while large countries can shift costs to foreign consumers, raising 4 
the likelihood of adoption.  Other political economy factors, such as the quality of domestic coal 
and election years, are also important determinants. 
 
I. Theoretical Framework 
  To provide a framework for our empirical analysis, we consider a general equilibrium 
model of an economy that uses electricity to produce a tradable good.  Electricity is generated by 
burning domestically mined coal.  Domestic consumers benefit from consumption but experience 
disutility from emissions generated by coal-fired power plants.  The allowable level of such 
emissions is endogenously determined by a government that maximizes a weighted sum of social 
welfare and contributions from organized interest groups.  The country does not engage in 
pollution control R&D, instead purchasing abatement services from international suppliers. 
  i. Production 
  To capture the importance of coal to downstream sectors, we posit a model with four 
production sectors: agriculture, which serves as numeraire, coal mining, electricity generation, 
and manufacturing.  Each sector uses intersectorally mobile labor as a factor of production while 
coal, electricity, and manufacturing production also require the use of sector-specific capital.  
The owners of these sector-specific factors engage in lobbying to influence the level of pollution 
regulation chosen by the government.
6 
  The economy contains L workers, each of which inelastically supplies one unit of labor.  
Agriculture serves as numeraire and is modeled as a tradable sector with a constant-returns 
technology.  We choose units so that one unit of output requires one unit of labor input, tying the 
                                                 
6 Specific-factor models are used frequently in endogenous policy analyses.  Because these models imply the 
existence of factor rents, they provide a mechanism by which agents have resources to expend in an attempt to 
influence government policy.  Hillman (1989) provides a useful overview in the context of trade policy. 5 
wage at unity.  We assume that aggregate labor supply,L , is large enough so that there is always 
a positive supply of locally produced agricultural products.     
Electricity from coal-fired plants is produced with labor, sector-specific capital, and coal, 
using the technology () min , , EE E E Ef K L C = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ .   E L  measures the labor used by power plants 
and  E C  is the quantity of coal burned. The function  () , EE E f KLexhibits constant returns to 
scale, but capital services of power facilities,  , E K  are in fixed supply. Electricity is not traded, so 
its price is determined on the domestic market. 
  Each unit of coal burned by electricity producers generates one unit of emissions and 
plants may be required to abate these emissions.  A regulatory standard requires electricity plants 
to apply A units of abatement services per unit of coal burned, resulting in an A% reduction in 
the volume of emissions. These services can be obtained only from the installation of imported 
pollution abatement equipment.  The domestic price of abatement services, which reflects the 
lease price of imported abatement equipment, is  ( ), A PT where T indicates the level of technology 
embodied in abatement devices.  We posit that the price of abatement is driven by innovation 
and that advances in the knowledge stock reduce the price of abatement: / 0. A PT ∂∂ <   
The return to owners of coal-fired power plants is 
(1)  () ,
N
EE CAE EE E PE P PAC w L P E w L π =− + −= −  
where  E P  is the price of electricity and  C P is the price of coal. To obtain the last term, note that 
one unit of electricity requires one unit of coal and define the net price of electricity as 
N
EE C A PP P P A =−− .  We assume that coal is not traded; its price is endogenously determined.
7 
                                                 
7 An alternative specification, allowing the price of coal to be exogenously determined, yields the same empirical 
predictions, with the exception of the effect of larger coal reserves on the political equilibrium.  6 
Coal is mined by the application of labor to coal reserves.  The technology for coal 
production, ( , ), CC C Cf K L =  exhibits constant returns to scale.  However, coal reserves, C K , are 
in fixed supply.  The return to owners of coal reserves is 
(2) . cC C PC w L π =− 
Manufactures are internationally traded and produced using sector-specific capital, M K , 
and labor,  , M L  in combination with electricity. The production technology for manufactures can 
be expressed as  () min , , , MM M M Mf K L E = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ where  M E is the quantity of electricity used in 
manufacturing. The function  () , MM M f KLexhibits constant returns to scale, but manufacturing 
capital is in fixed supply.  Letting  M P denote the domestic price of manufactures, earnings of 
manufacturing capital owners are  
(3) ,
N
M ME M M M PM PE w L PM w L π =− − =− 
where we use the requirement for one unit of electricity per unit of manufactures and define the 
net price of manufactures as 
N
M ME PP P =− .   
  As detailed in Appendix A, equilibrium in the production sector is defined as a vector of 
domestic product prices, factor rewards, and output levels for which the value marginal product 
of labor is equal across all sectors, the domestic supply of electricity and coal equals the 
domestic demand for electricity and coal, respectively, and labor demanded equals labor 
supplied, given world prices and the emissions abatement level chosen by the government.   
  ii. How are profits affected by a stricter abatement standard? 
  Profits of specific factor owners are affected by the abatement level chosen by the 
government. The extent to which profits fall when standards are tightened depends on the ability 
of firms to pass these costs through to consumers.  This pass-through ability is determined by 7 
both international and domestic market conditions.   Consider first a country pursuing free trade.  
Firms may pass through some cost increases to foreign consumers if local supply changes 
influence the world price – that is, if the country is large enough to influence its terms of trade.  
The ability of local producers to pass through regulatory costs depends on the elasticity of the 
excess demand for manufactures facing the home country.   If the country is small on world 
markets, it faces an infinitely elastic excess demand curve and it has no pass-through ability.    
  Even in small countries with no international market power, however, restrictive trade 
policies may confer on producers an ability to pass through costs to consumers.
8  A simple way 
to see this is to consider a small economy that uses a binding import quota.  Domestic demand 
beyond the quota amount is met by domestic producers.  The ability to pass regulatory costs to 
consumers, therefore, depends on the local excess demand elasticity.  This elasticity may 
reasonably be considered a function of the quota level: the more restrictive the quota, the more 
distorted is consumption compared to the free-trade level and the less elastic the demand curve.  
If this relationship holds, producers in countries with more restrictive trade policies will be able 
to pass through a larger share of the regulatory burden to consumers. 
  We denote excess demand by  ( ) MM X P and interpret this as excess world or excess (above 
quota) domestic demand, depending on the case.   In equilibrium, domestic supply must equal 
excess demand,  ( ) M M M XP = .  Using this condition, changes in domestic supply affect price to 












Total profits for specific-capital owners are M EC πππ ++. Noting that the price of labor is 
not affected by regulation and using (1) to (3), the change in profits from stricter regulation is:  
                                                 
8 As in Damania et al. (2003), we take trade policy as independent of regulatory policy as the former is set through 
multilateral negotiation. 8 
(4)  [] 0.
C ME





=+ += −+ <
∂∂∂∂
 
The first term in brackets is the direct cost of the additional regulation.  The second term is the 
addition to profits from a higher equilibrium price when the local supply curve shifts.  Appendix 
A shows that in general equilibrium  / 0 A MM A ≡∂ ∂ < and that  /0 . A π ∂∂ <   
  Result 1: Effect of a Stricter Abatement Standard on Profits.  The incomes of specific-
factor owners are decreasing in the level of the abatement standard.  Specific factor owners bear 
a larger regulatory burden the more limited their ability to pass costs through to consumers.   
  iii. How are consumers affected by a stricter abatement standard? 
We assume consumers care about the environment as well as consumption and have 
quasi-linear preferences of the form
9 
(5) ( ) (1 ) , AM UDu D A E ϕ =+ −−  
where  A D  is agricultural good consumption, and M D is manufactures consumption. Damage from 
emissions is proportional to unabated coal burning by electricity generation, (1 ) AE − .  Marginal 
damage,  , ϕ  is assumed to be a function of exogenous country characteristics, such as population 
density. Consumers each supply one unit of labor and have an income of  . w  
  This utility function implies that the marginal utility of income is unity, given positive 
consumption of the agricultural good.  Consequently, each consumer’s demand for the 
manufactured good, denoted by  ( ), MM DP is the inverse of ( )/ M M uD D ∂∂ .  Consumer surplus is 
given by  ( ) ( ( )) ( ). MM M M M M SP uD P PD P =− Indirect utility, our measure of consumer welfare, is: 
(6) ( , , ) ( ) (1 ) MM VP AE w SP AE ϕ =+ − −  
                                                 
9 Quasi-linear preferences simplify treatment of the political equilibrium and are used by Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) and Damania et al. (2003).  Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997) discuss the drawbacks of the method and 
develop a model with general preferences and nontransferable utility. 9 
The effect of a stricter standard on consumer welfare is 
(7)  (1 ) ( ) .
M
AM M M M A
M
P dV V V V E
EA E D P M
dA P A A E A
ϕϕ χ
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
=+ + = − − +
∂∂ ∂∂ ∂
 
Appendix A shows that / 0 A EE A ≡∂ ∂ < .  The environmental effect of regulation, the first two 
terms on the right-side of (7), unambiguously raises consumers’ welfare, directly by reducing 
emissions and indirectly by reducing electricity generation. The last term in (7) indicates that 
consumers’ welfare is influenced by regulation’s impact on M P .  Because a stricter abatement 
standard leads to a backward shift in the local supply curve,  M P rises and consumer surplus falls 
if firms have any pass-through ability.  In sum, a stricter abatement standard has benefits and 
possible costs for consumers: it reduces emissions but it also may raise the price of consumption. 
Result 2: Effect of a Stricter Abatement Standard on Consumers.  A stricter standard 
increases consumers’ welfare by reducing damage from emissions.  There is a consumer surplus 
loss from stricter regulation, however, if it raises the relative price of manufactures.  Consumer 
surplus loss is larger the greater firms’ ability to pass through compliance costs to consumers. 
iv. Political Economy 
  Because specific-factor owners bear some burden of regulation, they will expend real 
resources lobbying the government to avoid it.  We assume capital owners in the coal mining, 
electricity, and manufacturing sectors solve the collective action problem and form an organized 
“coal lobby,” which distributes the costs of organized action among its members.  The abatement 
standard is set by a government that values social welfare and contributions (or bribes) from this 
coal lobby.  It is the outcome of a non-cooperative, complete-information game played between 
the government, which sets the standard, and the organized lobby, which offers a contribution to 
the government to influence policy.  In the first stage, the lobby chooses a contribution schedule, 10 
B(A), that maximizes its members’ net welfare contingent on the abatement standard chosen by 
the government.  In the second stage of the game, the government chooses an abatement standard 
to maximize a weighted sum of contributions and aggregate social welfare.  Denoting social 
welfare by ( ) WA, the government’s objective function is   
( 8 )  () ()( 1 )() , GA WA BA αα =+ −  
where ,0 1, αα ≤≤is the weight placed by the government on social welfare.   
An equilibrium of the game is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the contribution 
schedule and the chosen abatement standard.  We confine ourselves to equilibria in truthful 
contribution schedules, which take the form:  
( 9 )  () m a x {() , 0 } , BA A b π =−  
where b is a constant.  Bernheim and Whinston (1986) argue that a truthful Nash equilibrium is 
among the equilibria of the game.
10   
The coal lobby ignores consumer surplus and environmental damage and, thus, the 
preferences of the lobby are given by  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). MEC A AAA ππ π π =+ + Substituting (9) into the 
government’s objective function and noting that social welfare gross-of-contributions is the sum 
of profits, labor income, and consumer surplus, minus the damage from coal burning, yields: 
( 1 0 )  () [ ( () ) ( 1 )() ] () . M GA w SP A AEA A b α ϕ π =+ − − + −  
Using results 1 and 2, the first-order condition for maximizing the government’s objective, 
allowing for complementary slackness, is: 
(11)  [ ]
* * (1 ) 0; 0, 0. A M MM A A MM A EA E D M P E M M i f A αϕ ϕ χ χ ⎡⎤ −− + − + ≤ < = ⎣⎦  
                                                 
10 A locally truthful contribution schedule has the property that  () / () / B AA AA π ∂∂ = ∂∂ at the equilibrium point.  
Grossman and Helpman (1994) provide an application to trade policy, Damania et al. (2003) an application to 
environmental policy and Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2008) an application to abatement technology investment. 11 
This expression characterizes the political-equilibrium abatement standard.  The first term on the 
left-hand side of (11) gives the (weighted) marginal benefit of regulation.  This marginal benefit 
is the sum of three impacts: the direct effect of on emissions, the indirect benefit from reduced 
coal-fired electricity use, and the possible reduction in consumer surplus. The second term gives 
the marginal cost for the government, in terms of reduced contributions from the coal lobby.   
When a non-negative standard is chosen, the marginal benefit of regulation to the 
government equals its marginal cost.  If firms have no ability to pass through cost increases, from 








=+ −  If the government 
chooses an abatement standard that does not require the complete abatement of emissions 
* (1 ) , A <  it must be that 0 A P αϕ −> .  Thus, the politically chosen abatement standard is weaker 
the larger the cost of abatement relative to the value of cleaner air to the government.
11 
  When firms do face an elastic excess demand curve, either because of international 
market power or domestic trade protection, the politically optimal abatement level is 
(12)  {}
* 1
1( ) ( ) ( 1 ) . AM M M A M M A
A
AP E M D M M M
E
αϕ α χ α χ
αϕ
=+ − + − + −  
The first term in brackets reflects the balance between direct regulatory costs and the value to 
consumers of lower emissions.  The second and third terms in brackets reflect the consequences 
of firms’ ability to shift costs forward to consumers.  As measured by the second term in 
brackets, producer revenue gained through the price rise is offset by lost consumer surplus.  If 
the country is a net exporter of manufactures and can influence its terms of trade, the gain to 
producers must exceed lost domestic consumer surplus as foreign consumers bear some of the 
                                                 
11 The abatement rate that maximizes social welfare for a small country is given by (11) when  1 α = .  It is readily 
seen that the socially optimal level exceeds the politically optimal level when a non-zero standard is chosen. 12 
burden.  If the country is a net importer but imports are relatively small, perhaps as a 
consequence of trade restriction, this term will also be relatively small.  The last term in brackets 
gives the extra weight placed on producer revenue gains, indicating that a producer price 
increase, whether from international or domestic market power, reduces the government’s 
regulatory cost in terms of lost contributions and leads to adoption of a stricter standard. 
Finally, because we are looking at countries that have not regulated, we note that the 
government may choose not to regulate.  The government will not enact an abatement standard if 
the benefits of abatement are not large enough to offset the cost of lost contributions, either 
because the relative marginal disutility of emissions (ϕ ) is small or the cost of abatement is high. 
 
II. Empirical strategy 
Our empirical analysis examines when a country first adopts emissions regulations for 
coal-fired power plants.  In addition, to understand the determinants of stringent regulation, we 
examine how long it takes to adopt regulations above a certain threshold.  Thus, the dependent 
variable is a binary variable indicating whether a country has enacted emission standards (for a 
specific pollutant) as of year t.  A country drops out of the sample the year after adoption.  We 
begin discussion of our empirical strategy by deriving predictions about the relationship between 
adoption and the determinants identified by our theory.  Next, we discuss construction of the 
dependent variable, followed by a description of the construction of our key explanatory 
variable, knowledge stocks.  We end this section with depictions of trends in our data. 
i. Empirical Predictions 
In this section, we explore the effect on the politically determined abatement standard of 
changes in our exogenous variables: the price of abatement services, the country’s pass-through 13 
ability, domestic coal reserves, the value consumers place on clean air, and the weight placed by 
the government on social welfare.  We consider a country for which the first-order condition (11) 
and the second-order condition  0, AA G < hold at a non-negative level of
* A .
12  
Prediction 1: A reduction in the price of abatement services tightens the political 
equilibrium abatement standard when there is no abatement.  
Proof: Total differentiation of (11), evaluated at








The sign follows from that assumption that the second-order condition holds. 
  Because most pollution control technologies are developed in just a few countries, 
international trade increases access to new technologies, effectively reducing the user cost of 
advanced abatement equipment and making adoption more likely.
13 Therefore, in our hazard 
analysis we interact the knowledge stock, representing the available new technologies, with 
alternative measures of openness.  Equation (13) suggests that the sign of the estimated 
coefficient for this interaction will reflect a higher adoption probability in more open economies 
when the knowledge stock grows.  Support for this form of “access effect” is consistent with 
technology embodied in imported goods or imports-related learning. 
We employ two alternative measures of trade openness for our estimation.  First is the 
ratio of the total value of imports to GDP.
14  This measure has been used in many prior studies 
on technological diffusion and it has the distinct advantage of being available for all countries in 
                                                 
12 We follow the literature and ignore effects that involve third derivatives of production functions as we have no 
economic interpretation for these effects and because the specific factor model does not place restrictions on them. 
13 The producers of nearly all the SO2 scrubbers listed in the IEA’s CoalPower 4 database are headquartered in the 
U.S., Japan, Germany, or Switzerland.  All of the listed FGD units installed in China come from foreign suppliers.   
14 We use import share to measure openness because most countries in our sample are abatement equipment 
importers.  The most commonly used measure of openness is exports plus imports as a share of GDP.  This 
alternative measure is highly correlated with the imports-to-GDP ratio. 14 
our sample for most years.  However, this ratio is also influenced by factors other than trade 
policy, most notably country size, limiting our ability to isolate an “access effect” of openness 
from the ability to pass-through regulatory costs to foreign consumers.
15  Consequently, we 
employ an alternative measure that controls for country characteristics, including the size of the 
economy, the Hiscox-Kastner trade policy orientation index (TPOI).  This index is constructed 
from the residuals of a gravity model of bilateral trade flows, expressed relative to the sample 
maximum intercept.  The numbers represent the percentage reduction in imports in each year due 
to deviations of trade policy from a free-trade benchmark.  As such, higher values indicate more 
“missing trade” and, thus, measure a country’s barriers to trade not accounted for by distance, 
remoteness, and other controls used in the gravity estimation.
16 
Prediction 2:  In the political equilibrium, greater ability by producers to pass compliance 
costs through to consumers leads to a stricter standard. 
Proof:  Totally differentiating (11) and rearranging yields: 
(14) 












We consider the effect of international market power, conveyed by country size relative to the 
world economy, separately from the market power conveyed on domestic producers from trade 
restrictions.  First, if the country has some ability to influence the international terms of trade and 
it is a net exporter of manufactures, the term in brackets is positive and the total derivative is 
                                                 
15 Using direct policy measures is also problematic.  Average tariff rates underestimate the level of protection as the 
weights used reflect distorted trade flows and do not measure non-tariff barriers.  Non-tariff barrier measures are 
available for only isolated years.  Commonly used alternatives, such as tariff revenue as a share of total imports, 
have disadvantages shared by average tariff rates. 
16 Hiscox and Kastner (2002) describe the gravity model used to estimate the residuals and the index as well as 
provide a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the index.  The Hiscox-Kastner index is available for 
most countries in our sample, with the exception of Eastern European countries and Zimbabwe, for all years in the 
sample.  We thank Scott Kastner for providing updated data.  The correlation between the Hiscox-Kastner index and 
import shares is -0.4383, suggesting that the two measures pick up different effects. 15 
positive.  In this case, greater pass-through of compliance costs unambiguously increases the 
politically determined standard as the impact on producers’ contributions exceeds the weight 
given to that on consumer surplus.  Moreover, if the country is a net importer of manufactures 
but these are relatively small, defined as ( )/ (1 )/ , M DM M αα −< − the term in brackets is 
positive and the total derivative is positive.  These considerations imply that our empirical 
analysis of the adoption decision should control for the size of the domestic economy relative to 
the world economy, which we measure as merchandise exports as a share of world merchandise 
exports.  Data for this measure is drawn from the World Development Indicators. 
  Even in a country too small to influence its terms of trade, producers may be able to pass 
regulatory costs along to consumers if trade policy is sufficiently restrictive.  For this reason we 
also include the direct effect of our two alternative openness measures defined above: the total 
value of imports relative to GDP and the Hiscox-Kastner trade policy orientation index. 
Prediction 3: Holding the world price of manufactures and all other factor endowments 
fixed, larger coal reserves weaken the political equilibrium abatement standard. 












As shown in Appendix A, a larger coal sector reduces the domestic price of coal and increases 
coal-fired electricity generation: / 0 C EK ∂∂> .  The term in brackets is positive is the government 
chooses a standard that is less than full abatement, as discussed for the small-country case.
17  
In our empirical work, we capture the size of specific investments in coal using coal 
production per capita and the share of electricity produced with coal.
18  We expect larger coal 
                                                 
17 If we amend the model so that coal is freely traded, policy does not depend on the size of domestic coal reserves. 
18 Data on coal production comes from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/coal.html.  16 
production to be associated with a lower probability of regulating emissions from coal-fired 
plants.  We also control for lignite production per capita. Lignite coal is the lowest quality coal 
and is dirtier than other types of coal.  We expect countries with more lignite to be more likely to 
adopt regulation, as the marginal benefit of abatement is higher. 
Prediction 4: An increase in the disutility consumers experience from coal burning leads 
to a stricter abatement standard in the political equilibrium. 
Proof: Totally differentiate (11) to obtain: 
(16) 










The sign of the numerator is negative and, thus, the derivative is positive.  
In our hazard analysis, we include several measures that capture the marginal benefit of a 
cleaner environment,ϕ .  The first of these measures is GDP per capita.  If environmental quality 
is a normal good, richer consumers will place a higher weight on environmental quality relative 
to consumption, and thus should regulate sooner.  The second measure, population density, also 
relates to the term ϕ  in our theoretical model.  We expect that more densely populated countries 
will regulate sooner, all else equal, because of the proximity of residences to power plants.  
Prediction 5: An increase in the weight placed on social welfare relative to contributions 
leads to a stricter political equilibrium abatement standard. 
Proof: Totally differentiate (11) to obtain: 
(17) 
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The sign of the term in brackets, which captures the marginal benefit to consumers of abatement, 
must be positive if a non-negative level of abatement is chosen. The denominator is negative by 
assumption, so the derivative is positive.  17 
To capture the α term in the government’s objective function, we include measures of a 
citizen’s ability to make his or her views known to the government. The first measure is the 
Freedom House index of political rights, reasoning that more democratic governments place a 
higher weight on social welfare.  The second measure is whether or not it is an election year.  
The government will place a higher weight on political contributions when an election is near.  
We also include measures for the ideology of the ruling party, controlling for whether the 
government is liberal or conservative, as opposed to centrist.
19   
ii. Regulations 
No single source of information on coal-fired power plant regulations exists.  By 
consulting a series of publications by the International Energy Agency (IEA) Clean Coal Centre 
(Vernon 1988, Soud 1991, McConville 1997, and Sloss 2003),  we collected detailed information 
on coal-fired power plant regulations in most developed countries, as well as some developing 
countries, primarily in Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe.  We supplemented this information 
with country-specific sources where necessary.
20  To narrow the task, we searched for additional 
regulatory information only for countries that get at least 10 percent of their electric power from 
coal.
21  In some cases we were unable to identify when, or if, regulations were put in place, 
leaving us with regulatory data for 45 of the 50 countries that get at least 10 percent of electricity 
from coal.
22  For each, we identify the year in which emissions restrictions on coal-fired power 
plants were enacted for both SO2 and NOX.
 23  Additionally, for NOX we identify both the initial 
                                                 
19 If the country has a chief executive, the party of that person is used here.  If not, the majority party in the 
legislative branch is used. 
20 These sources are listed separately at the end of the references. 
21 These countries get at least 10 % of power from coal in at least one year between 1980 and 2001.  We also include 
Sweden, an environmental technology source, even though it does not generate much power from coal. 
22 The five missing countries are Luxembourg, Russia, North Korea, Dominican Republic, and Moldova. 
23 Our goal was to find regulations that provide incentives to install pollution control devices, such as flue gas 
desulfurization (FGD) units to remove SO2 emissions.  Thus, we sought the enactment of specific emissions 
regulations for power plants, rather than general legislation on ambient air quality.  One case, Israel, never adopts 18 
regulation and the adoption of rules stringent enough to necessitate the use of the more expensive 
post-combustion abatement techniques described in the next section.
24 
Looking at the adoption data supports the notion that adoption of regulation, rather than 
adoption of the technology itself, is the first step in studying the diffusion of environmental 
technologies.  Figure 1 shows, by year, the percentage of countries that have adopted a 
regulation.
25  Note the S-shaped pattern that is typical of traditional studies on adoption of 
technology.  Each regulation has a few early adopters, who are typically the technology leaders 
(e.g. Japan and the U.S.).  This is followed by a period of more rapid adoption which, for these 
policies, occurs in the mid-1980s.  A period of slower adoption among the remaining countries 
follows.  As plants will not typically adopt the control technologies used to reduce SO2 and NOX 
without regulatory incentive, understanding the pattern of adoption of these regulations is the 
first step towards understanding the international diffusion of these environmental technologies. 
iii. Knowledge stocks 
A key goal of this paper is to estimate the extent to which access to technological 
advances increase the likelihood of adopting environmental regulation.  For this, we use 
pollution-control device patents as a measure of innovation.  We accumulate these patents over 
time in a knowledge stock designed to capture the level of technology in any given year.
 26     
                                                                                                                                                             
specific regulations, using licenses negotiated with plants on an individual basis instead, and so we drop it from our 
sample.  In a second case, Mexico enacted an SO2 standard for power plants in 1993, but the allowable level of 
emissions is so high that plants do not need to install FGD equipment (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 1997). 
24 We define stringent regulations as those restricting NOX emissions to 410 mg/m
3 or less, which is the regulation 
introduced in Japan when they tightened NOX emission limits in 1986. 
25 The figure only includes the 39 countries that remain in our sample after merging with other data sources. 
26 Popp (2005) discusses the advantages and disadvantages of using patent data when studying environmental 
technologies.  Among the disadvantages, not all successful innovations are patented, as inventors may choose to 
forgo patent protection to avoid disclosing proprietary information.  Levin et al (1987) report significant differences 
in the propensity to patent across industries.  Fortunately, this is less problematic when studying the development of 
a single technology than when using patents to study inventive activity across technologies.  19 
Patents are granted by national patent offices in individual countries and protection is 
only valid in the country that grants the patent.  An inventor must file for protection in each 
nation in which protection is desired.  Nearly all patent applications are first filed in the home 
country of the inventor.  The date of the initial application is referred to as the priority date.  If 
the patent is granted, protection begins from the priority date.  If the inventor files abroad within 
one year, the inventor will have priority over any patent applications received in those countries 
since the priority date that describe similar inventions.   
These additional filings of the same patent application in different countries are known as 
patent families.  Because of the costs of filing abroad, along with the one-year waiting period 
that gives inventors additional time to gauge their invention’s value, only the most valuable 
inventions are filed in several countries.  Moreover, filing a patent application is a signal that the 
inventor expects the invention to be profitable in that country.  Because of this, researchers such 
as Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) have used data on patent families as proxies for the quality 
of individual patents.  Lanjouw and Mody (1996) use such data to show that environmental 
technologies patented by developed country firms are more general than similar inventions from 
developing countries, as the developed country inventions have larger patent families. 
Because we use patents to identify the technological frontier, we take advantage of patent 
families to find the most important ones.  We begin by selecting all relevant patents granted in 
the United States since 1969.  Relevant technologies include those that reduce SO2 or NOX 
emissions.  These include flue gas desulfurization (FGD) units to remove SO2 emissions, 
combustion modification techniques, such as low NOX burners, designed to reduce the formation 
of NOX in the combustion process, and equipment such as selective catalytic reduction (SCR) 
units designed to remove NOX emissions from a plant’s exhaust (post-combustion treatment).  20 
We choose the U.S. because it is a major supplier of pollution control equipment and, because of 
the importance of the U.S. market, many foreign companies choose to patent in the U.S.
27  We 
keep only patents with at least one foreign patent family member.  
We use the European Classification System (ECLA) to identify relevant patents, as it 
provides detail necessary to distinguish between the types of pollution controlled by various 
technologies.
28   Appendix B lists the relevant ECLA codes for these technologies.  Using the 
European Patent Office’s on-line database, esp@cenet, we downloaded a list of patent numbers 
for documents published in the US.
29,30  We obtained additional descriptive information on these 
patents from Delphion, an on-line database of patents, including the application, priority, and 
issue date, the home country of the inventor, and data on patent families, which we use to 
identify patents with multiple family members.
31  These patents were sorted by priority year, as 
this date corresponds most closely with the actual inventive activity.
32  Figure 2 shows the 
number of U.S. patents with multiple family members for each of three technologies: SO2, NOX 
combustion modification techniques, and NOX post- combustion treatment. 
We use these patents to construct a stock of knowledge for each year.  Using β1, the rate 
of decay, to capture the obsolescence of older patent and β2, the rate of diffusion, to capture 
delays in the flow of knowledge, the stock of knowledge at time t for technology j is written as: 
(18) 













=− ∑  
                                                 
27 As a robustness check, we constructed a similar stock using patents granted in Germany.  See appendix C. 
28 ECLA classifications are assigned by patent examiners at the European Patent Office. Traditional patent 
classification systems, such as the International Patent Classification system and the US patent system, do not 
provide enough detail to distinguish among technologies at the level needed for this paper. 
29 The database can be found at http://ep.espacenet.com/. 
30 These data are also used in Popp (2006a), and are described in more detail there. 
31 This database is available at http://www.delphion.com. 
32 In addition, using priority dates, rather than the date of grant, removes noise introduced by variations in length of 
the patent application process.  Because only granted patents were published in the US until 2001, the data only 
includes patent applications that were subsequently granted.   21 
The rate of diffusion is multiplied by s+1 so that diffusion is not constrained to be zero in the 
current period.  The base results presented below use a decay rate of 0.1, and a rate of diffusion 
of 0.25 for each stock calculation.
33  Figure 3 illustrates these stocks, with the stock in 1980 
normalized to 100 in each case.  Note that the value of the stock for SO2 progresses rather 
smoothly through time, whereas both NOX technologies experience periods of growth after major 
environmental regulations.  For example, both Germany and Japan passed stringent NOX 
regulations in the 1980s that led to the development of new SCR technologies (Popp 2006a). 
  iv. Additional data and trends 
Table 1 describes the variables and their sources in greater detail.  The final sample 
includes data from 1980-2000 on 39 countries.
34 Table 2 provides descriptive data for each of 
these variables for the 39 countries used in the empirical analysis. 
Before proceeding with the empirical analysis, we take a first look at some correlations 
between key explanatory variables and adoption.  Figures 4-6 show per capita GDP, in 1995 US 
dollars, in the year of adoption of regulations for SO2 and NOX.  As mentioned earlier, stringent 
NOX regulations refers to regulations strong enough that plants would likely use SCR technology 
to reduce emissions.  Along the x-axis, countries are sorted by the year in which they adopted.  
Consider first Figure 4, which shows this relationship for SO2.  The figure is divided into three 
segments.  The first segment includes 6 countries that adopt before 1980, the first year of data in 
our regression.  With the exception of the Philippines, each of these countries adopts at a per 
                                                 
33 These rates are consistent with others used in the R&D literature. For example, discussing the literature on an 
appropriate lag structure for R&D capital, Griliches (1995) notes that previous studies suggest a structure peaking 
between 3 and 5 years. The rates of decay and diffusion used in this paper provide a lag peaking after 4 years.  
Appendix D presents sensitivity analysis with respect to the rates of decay and diffusion.  
34 The countries with missing data are Vietnam (no data in WDI), Poland, Czech Republic (no data in WDI until 
after the country adopts regulation), Hong Kong (no political data), and Ukraine (no data on merchandise exports).  
In addition, we do not have trade data for Romania until 1990, and so delete Romanian observations earlier than 
1990.  This is consistent with our treatment of other Eastern European countries, where we only consider adoption 
decisions made in the post-Communist era. This is due both to data availability and because under the Communist 
regime, many of these countries had stringent environmental laws on the books that were not enforced. 22 
capita income roughly between $15,000 and $20,000.
35  Of the countries that adopt between 
1980 and 2000, we see a strong trend of adoption at lower income over time.  Finally, the third 
segment of Figure 4 includes countries that have yet to adopt SO2 regulations.  In general, these 
are all low income countries.  The exceptions are Australia and New Zealand.  The coal found in 
these countries is generally low in sulfur (Soud 1991, McConville 1997).  Similar trends hold for 
NOX, as shown in Figure 5.  In comparison, there are still many countries that have not adopted 
stringent NOX regulations (Figure 6).  Those that have adopted are generally high income 
countries, with a major exception being Eastern European countries.   
 
III. Regressions 
Following the approach used by economists studying technology adoption, we use a 
duration model that captures both a baseline hazard and country-specific effects on the adoption 
of environmental regulation.
36  These models separate the hazard function into two parts, 
allowing for a baseline hazard, h0(t), that does not vary by country.  Letting Xt represent a vector 
of explanatory variables, β represent the vector of parameters to be estimated, and t represent 
time yields a hazard function to be estimated of the form: 
(19)     h(t,Xt,β) = h0(t)exp(Xt′β). 
To estimate equation (19), the baseline hazard h0 must be specified.  We present results 
using three specifications common to the adoption literature: the exponential, Weibull, and 
Gompertz distributions. The exponential distribution assumes the baseline hazard is constant 
over time, whereas the others assume that the baseline hazard is a function of time.  As a further 
                                                 
35 Early adoption of regulation in the Philippines is explained by close bilateral relations with the United States, 
which includes aid for environmental protection. 
36 See, for example, Hannan and McDowell 1984, Rose and Joskow 1990, Karshenas and Stoneman 1993, Kerr and 
Newell 2003, Snyder et al. 2003, and Popp 2006b. 23 
robustness check, we estimate a Cox (1972) proportional hazards model, which uses semi-
parametric estimation instead of specifying the baseline hazard. Once the baseline hazard is 
specified, we estimate equation (19) using maximum likelihood estimation, calculating robust 
standard errors because we have multiple observations per country.
37  In the hazard model, 
exp(β) gives the change in the probability of adoption for each variable. To aid interpretation, we 
normalize all non-interacted continuous variables so that a one unit change in the normalized 
variable is equivalent to a ten percent change from its mean value.
38  We present results for the 
adoption of SO2 regulation, of NOX regulation, and of stringent NOX regulations that require the 
use of post-combustion control techniques. 
 i.  SO2 Results 
In the case of SO2, our data include six countries that adopt prior to 1980, which is the 
first year in our data set.  We drop these six countries from the regression analysis.
39  Table 3 
presents results using various measures of trade policy.  In this table, all results are presented 
using the Weibull baseline hazard.  Our main interest is the interaction of knowledge and trade 
policy.  Column 1 uses import share as a measure of trade policy.  Column 2 uses the Hiscox-
Kastner trade policy orientation index (TPOI).  While TPOI is our preferred policy measure, as 
import shares may be complicated by scale effects, TPOI is not available for the Eastern 
European countries in our sample, nor for Zimbabwe.  In both cases, note that the interaction 
between policy and the knowledge stock has the correct sign, as both a larger import share and a 
lower TPOI signify more open trade policies.  While the interacted coefficients appear small, 
                                                 
37 For an introduction to duration data see Cox and Oakes (1985), Kiefer (1988), and Lancaster (1990). 
38 The normalization first divides each continuous variable by its mean, multiplies by 10, and then takes deviations 
from the mean by subtracting 10.  This procedure is introduced in Kerr and Newell (2003), and results in normalized 
variables that have a mean of 0.  Table 1 indicates the variables that are normalized. 
39 An alternative is to add a term to the likelihood function to account for the six early adopters (see, for example, 
Popp (2006b).  One drawback of such an approach is that it assumes that early adopters are influenced by the same 
forces as later adopters.  This seems unlikely, as early adopters tend to be innovators of environmental technology.   24 
recall that the base level of knowledge is 100.  Thus, for the base level of technology, a one 
percent increase in openness increases the likelihood of adoption by 13 to 17 percent.  In 
addition, in each case the direct effect of our trade policy variable, which measures the ability of 
producers to pass cost increases on to domestic consumers, reduces the probability of adopting a 
regulation, with a one percent increase in openness reducing the likelihood of adoption by about 
30 percent.  Both the access effect and the domestic pass-through effect are significant at the 1 
percent level using TPOI, but only at the 10 percent level using import shares.   
These results suggest two competing effects.  First, greater openness provides easier 
access to technology, making countries more willing and able to adopt environmental regulation.  
At the same time, increased openness raises domestic firms’ need to compete with foreign firms, 
making it harder to pass cost increases to consumers.  In each case, the access effect dominates 
when the knowledge stock is just over double its 1980 value.
40  Further emphasizing the role of 
openness, of the nine countries in our sample that never adopt SO2 regulations, the average level 
of import shares for each of these countries across the 1980-2000 period is eight percentage 
points below the average of the sample as a whole and the average TPOI index is 12 percentage 
points less open than average.  Of these nine countries, only New Zealand, Morocco, and Mexico 
have above average levels of import shares by 2000, and only Australia, New Zealand, Chile, 
and South Africa have a below average (e.g. more open) TPOI by 2001.
41 
Our third trade-related measure, world export share, captures the ability of a country to 
pass cost increases on to foreign consumers through a favorable terms-of-trade effect.  This 
                                                 
40 The access effect dominates when exp(βopen + βinteractK) > 1, so that βopen + βinteractK > 0.  This holds when K > -
βopen/βinteract.  This occurs for a value of K equal to 221 using import shares, and 203 using TPOI.  Knowledge 
surpasses these values in 1993 and 1990, respectively.  Interestingly, it is after this date that the majority of low 
income countries adopt SO2 regulations.  In Figure 4, countries to the right of Korea adopted regulations after 1990 
and those to the right of Romania adopted after 1993. 
41 Recall that New Zealand and Australia do not adopt SO2 regulations because domestic coal supplies are naturally 
low in sulfur. Only 2 of the 7 remaining non-adopting countries are more open than average. 25 
effect is positive, suggesting that larger countries with greater market power are more likely to 
regulate, as regulatory cost increases can be at least partially passed on to foreign consumers.  
However, the effect is only significant using the TPOI.  In this case, a one percentage point 
increase in world export share increases the likelihood of adoption by 41 percent.   
The lower significance of the trade measures using import shares may come from 
correlations between import shares and the world export share.  To investigate this, columns 3 
and 4 present results without world export share, and columns 5 and 6 present results without the 
direct effect of import shares or TPOI.
42  Note from column 3 that dropping world export share 
does increase the significance of the import share variables.  However, dropping the direct effect 
of import shares or TPOI does not greatly improve the significance of world export share. 
Turning to other variables, we again note that there are no significant differences across 
the various specifications.  A ten percent increase in per capita income increases adoption rates 
by about 36%, supporting other results finding that environmental quality is a normal good.  As 
expected, more densely populated countries adopt more quickly, as pollution problems are likely 
be more severe when population is concentrated and more people are exposed to pollution.   
However, this is only significant in the models without world export share.   
Our next set of variables describes the coal sector.  As expected, regulation is less likely 
when the coal sector is important.  Coal production per capita has a negative, although not 
always statistically significant, effect on adoption.  When significant, a country producing 10 
percent more coal per capita than average is about 15 percent less likely to adopt SO2 regulations 
for coal-fired power plants.  However, if a country has a greater share of dirty coal, they are 
more likely to adopt, as the pollution problems will be greater.  Countries producing 10 percent 
                                                 
42 Another possibility is that the different results occur because of the smaller sample used with TPOI.  However, the 
results in column 1 hold when we omit Eastern Europe and Zimbabwe, as is the case for the regressions using TPOI. 26 
more lignite coal than average are 5 percent more likely to adopt.  Note, however, that the net 
effect of the two coal variables remains negative.  While countries with dirtier coal are more 
likely to adopt than a country producing a similar amount of cleaner coal, they remain less likely 
to adopt than the typical country.  Finally, we find that the percentage of electricity from coal is 
insignificant.  This result may be due to competing effects:  Having more power come from coal 
makes the need to regulate greater, but it also raises the cost of regulation.   
Our more general set of political variables yield mixed results, as most are insignificant.  
One striking finding is the strong negative effect of an executive branch election year.  No 
country enacted SO2 regulations in an executive branch election year.  Political rights, measured 
using the Freedom House index, are insignificant, as are the effect of political parties.  Although 
this may be a surprise given that liberal governments are typically seen as environmentally 
friendly, this is less likely the case in lower income countries, where liberal governments may 
resist regulation in order to protect the interests of low-income consumers.
43 
Finally, Table 4 presents sensitivity to our choice of the baseline hazard.  The table 
presents results for the model using TPOI for each specification of the baseline hazard, including 
results both with and without the direct effect of knowledge.
44,45  Note first that, except for the 
direct effect of the knowledge stocks, there are no substantive differences across the various 
specifications.  Of the three parameterized baseline hazards, Aikike’s information criterion 
shows the Weibull to be the best fit.  Notably, the Weibull results in column 1 are very similar to 
the semi-parametric results obtained using the Cox model.  However, the Weibull has two 
                                                 
43 Dutt and Mitra (2005) find empirical support for the proposition that the ideology of the government in power 
influences the restrictiveness of trade policy but that the direction of this effect depends on country GDP. 
44 We focus on results using TPOI, as that measure of trade policy is less confounded by country size.  Results are 
similar using import shares and are available from the authors upon requests.  The only differences are consistent 
with those found in Table 3: the knowledge stock/import share interaction is less significant and the effect of coal 
production per capita is more significant. 
45 For the Cox model, we only include results without the direct effect of knowledge, as the Cox model cannot be 
estimated when including the knowledge stocks, as this measure only varies across time. 27 
advantages over Cox.  One is that it is more efficient (Cleves et al, 2004).  In addition, because 
no country adopts regulation in an election year, the Cox model is unable to estimate a 
coefficient for the election year variable.  A concern with parameterizing the baseline hazard is 
that, if the parameterization is incorrect, the estimated coefficients will be biased.  The similar 
results between the Weibull and the Cox models show that this is not the case here.  Given this, 
we consider the Weibull results in column 1 our preferred specification.
46,47 
ii. NOX regulation results 
Table 5 compares the results across pollutants, using the Weibull model.
48  For NOX, we 
distinguish between two classes of regulation.  In most cases, initial regulation levels are weak 
enough that pre-combustion modifications are sufficient to comply with the regulations.  The 
middle columns of Table 5 look at the adoption of these regulations.  To consider stringency, we 
also look at adoption of NOX regulations stringent enough to require post-combustion treatment 
of the flue gas.  Such treatment requires expensive capital equipment (typically a selective 
catalytic reduction unit, or SCR), making such regulations less prevalent, particularly among 
developing countries.  As shown in Figure 6, most countries adopting stringent NOX regulations 
are rich countries.  Exceptions are Indonesia and several Eastern European countries.  The last 
two columns of Table 5 focus on the adoption of these more stringent regulations. 
                                                 
46 As shown in Table 4, we are unable to obtain precise estimates of the direct effect of knowledge stocks because 
they only vary by time, not by country.  Thus, when we estimate a time-varying hazard, the effect of these stocks is 
not uniquely identified.  Fortunately, the estimates of other parameters do not change when knowledge is dropped. 
The Weibull and Gompertz results are nearly identical both with and without it.  In these models, the knowledge 
stock essentially provides more detailed parameterization of the baseline hazard, rather than serving as a direct 
estimate of the overall effect of knowledge. In the exponential model, leaving knowledge stock out of the model 
results in misspecification, as it assumes that learning effects are insignificant and that all time-varying effects are 
captured by the explanatory variables.  Here, coefficients do change and the log-likelihood decreases when 
knowledge stock is omitted.  In this case, the knowledge stock acts as a proxy for the time-varying hazard, which the 
other models show to be significant.   
47 Note that we cannot directly compare the log-likelihood from the Cox model and the parameterized models, as the 
Cox model maximizes a partial log-likelihood function. 
48 As with SO2, results do not vary using baseline hazard parameterizations and the Weibull model provides the best 
fit of the baseline hazard parameterizations.  Other results are available from the authors by request.  Also, as with 
SO2, countries that adopt NOX regulations before 1980 are omitted from our sample. 28 
Looking first at the adoption of any NOX regulation, we see that the interaction between 
knowledge and import shares is positive, but that the magnitude is smaller than before.  This 
smaller magnitude is partially offset by greater variation in the knowledge stock for NOX 
technologies.  Still, at the average value of knowledge, the effect of a one percent increase of 
import shares is nearly one-third as great as for SO2.  The direct effect of import shares is 
negative, as expected, but also about one-third as great as for SO2.  Finally, the ability to pass 
costs on to foreign consumers, measured using world export shares, is insignificant.  Because the 
costs of boiler modifications necessary to meet weaker NOX regulations are lower than the costs 
of SO2 controls,  technological advances and the ability to pass along cost increases appear less 
important here than for sulfur dioxide.  Finally, note that while these trade policy effects are 
insignificant using TPOI, this change occurs because of the smaller sample size.  If the model 
using import shares is re-run without observations from Eastern Europe and Zimbabwe, the 
import share effects are also insignificant. 
As for other variables, the results are very similar to SO2.  GDP and population density 
increase adoption rates.  The political influences of the coal industry are generally insignificant, 
except for our measure of dirty coal, which increases the probability of adoption. 
Finally, the last two columns of Table 5 examine the adoption of stringent NOX 
regulations.  Unlike the initial adoption of SO2 or NOX regulations, availability of knowledge is 
insignificant.  Because it is mainly leading economies that are adopting stringent NOX 
regulations and making use of SCR technology, access to technology from abroad appears less 
important – countries adopting stringent regulations are generally those capable of producing and 
improving SCR technology on their own.   29 
Among other variables, GDP is still important – richer countries are more likely to 
increase the stringency of NOX regulations.  Unlike previous results, political parties appear 
more important, as middle of the road governments are more likely to tighten regulations than 
either liberal or conservative governments. Finally, the most notable difference is that, 
controlling for other country characteristics, the Eastern European countries are much more 
likely to pass stringent NOX regulations than other countries.  Here, the influence of the 
European Union (EU) is important, as countries wishing to join the EU must comply with EU 
environmental standards. Desire to join the EU pushes these Eastern European countries to enact 
regulations more stringent than would otherwise be chosen for their level of development.
49   
 
IV. Conclusions 
In debates on the effect of globalization and the environment, commonly cited effects are 
scale effects (more production leads to more pollution), composition effects (a change in the mix 
of economic activity can improve or exacerbate emissions), and technique effects (cleaner 
technologies are used as countries grow).
50  One challenge in empirically studying these effects 
is separately identifying the role of each.  Using the adoption of environmental regulations, 
rather than a generic measure of environmental quality, as our dependent variable, we provide 
new evidence on the technique effect, showing that increased access to technology via trade 
increases the likelihood that a country will adopt environmental regulation.  While we do find 
that richer countries adopt regulation first, developing countries adopt environmental regulation 
at earlier stages of development than did developed countries, as they can take advantage of off-
the-shelf technologies to carry out emission reductions.   
                                                 
49 See, for example, “Eastern Europe’s environment: Clean up or clear out,” The Economist, Dec. 11, 1999, p. 47. 
50 Esty (2001) provides a review of this literature.  Copeland and Taylor (2003) provide a rigorous theoretical 
analysis of these effects in the context of an open economy. 30 
Our results provide new evidence on the role of economic openness in allowing these 
spillovers to spread across country borders.  We posit that openness both eases access to 
technology and limits domestic firms’ ability to pass regulatory costs to consumers.  Our 
findings support the view that small, open economies are least able to transfer these costs away 
from firms and, thus, are less likely to regulate, ceteris paribus.  They suggest that international 
burden shifting is an important factor in the political economy of environmental regulation.  
In addition to the links between trade and technology, we find that other political 
economy forces are important.  Factors affecting the value placed on abatement, such as 
population density and income level, increase the likelihood of regulation. Moreover, regulations 
that negatively affect the coal sector are less likely in countries with large coal reserves, but more 
likely the larger are reserves of dirty coal.  Finally, the politics of globalization appear important, 
as Eastern European countries have passed more stringent regulations than other countries at 
similar levels of development in their progress toward joining the EU. 
Studying the adoption of environmental regulation is an important step in understanding 
the diffusion of environmental technologies.  Regulation is particularly important for end-of-the-
pipe technologies like those studied in this paper, as these technologies impose costs on firms 
while only providing the benefit of compliance.
51  Our work suggests that free trade can enhance 
the diffusion of these technologies, but that this diffusion comes indirectly, with the decision to 
regulate preceding a plant’s decision to adopt clean technology.  Given these links, it is worth 
considering when other influences might encourage adoption, so that clean technologies can be 
adopted in countries that do not yet regulate emissions.   
                                                 
51 While some green technologies may diffuse without regulation, environmental policy will be needed to encourage 
socially optimal adoption levels.  For example, while technologies that increase fuel efficiency, potentially reducing 
fossil fuel consumption and the associated carbon emissions, could diffuse without regulation, adopters will consider 
the private gains from lower fuel costs, but not the social benefits of reduced emissions.  31 
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Table 1 – Data Definitions and Sources 
 




Index created by fixed country-year effects in a gravity model of 
bilateral trade  HK 
Import Share  (Imports)/GDP  WDI 
International Market Position 
World Export Share  Merchandise exports as  share of world merchandise exports  WDI 
Political Economy – Marginal Benefit of Abatement 
GDP Per Capita*  Per capita GDP in constant 1995 US $  WDI 
Population Density*  People per square km  WDI 
Political Economy --Importance of Coal 
% Electricity from Coal*  % of electricity production from coal sources  WDI 
Coal Production Per 
Capita*  Total coal production, in quadrillion BTU, per person EIA/WDI 
Lignite Production Per 
Capita*  Production of lignite coal, in million short tons, per person  EIA/WDI 
Political Economy -- Other 
Election Year  Dummy = 1 if  executive branch election held that year  DPI 
Political Rights  Index of political rights, ranging from 1 (free) to 7 (not free)  FH 
Liberal  Dummy = 1 if country led by a liberal party  DPI 
Conservative  Dummy = 1 if country led by a conservative party  DPI 
* --  These variables are scaled in the regression so that a one-unit change represents a 10% deviation 
from the mean. 
Sources: 
WDI: World Development Indicators 
EIA/WDI: Coal data from Energy Information Administration International Energy Annual 2003, 
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea.  Population data from WDI. 
FH: Index produced by Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org) 
DPI: Database of Political Institutions (Keefer 2005) 
HK: Hiscox and Kastner (2002) 
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Table 2 – Descriptive Data 
 
variable N  mean  sd  min  p50  max 
Knowledge Stock: SO2  21  190.300  46.381  100.000  207.422  239.876 
Knowledge Stock: NOXPre  21  251.636  131.207  100.000  202.893  453.873 
Knowledge Stock: NOXPost  21  209.733  81.366  100.000  225.402  301.700 
Import  shares  771  30.574 14.410 6.855 27.873 84.398 
Trade Policy Orientation Index  672  31.454 14.861 1.970 27.471 77.978 
World Export Share  771  2.120  2.890  0.030  0.924  12.775 
GDP Per Capita  771  13724.48 12146.67 166.75  11179.19  46815.50
Population Density  771  123.121 114.878  1.912  93.345  476.127 
% Electricity from Coal  771  33.354  25.811  0  27.263  99.474 
Coal Production Per Capita  771  2.17E-08  4.47E-08 0 5.19E-09  3.47E-07 
Lignite Production Per Capita  771  0.001  0.001  0  5.55E-08  0.007 
Election Year  771  0.057  0.232  0  0  1 
Political Rights  771  2.258  1.784  1  1  7 
Liberal 771  0.379  0.485  0  0  1 
Conservative 771  0.431  0.495  0  0  1 
Eastern Europe dummy  771  0.101  0.302  0  0  1 
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Table 3 – Regression Results: Adoption of SO2 Regulations 
 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Knowledge  Stock  -0.0893 -0.0018 -0.0970 -0.0107 -0.0403 -0.0456 
   (-2.499) (-0.064) (-3.053) (-0.406) (-1.665) (-1.840) 
Knowledge x Import Share  0.0016  0.0019  -0.0001 
(1.849) (2.497) (-0.975) 
Import Share  -0.3554  -0.4233 
   (-1.885)     (-2.507)          
Knowledge x Trade Policy 
Orientation Index 
-0.0012 -0.0009 0.0001 
(-3.009) (-2.439) (0.389) 
Trade Policy Orientation 
Index  
0.2608 0.1817 
   (3.361)    (2.750)        
World  Export  Share  0.1618 0.3452  0.3307 0.2363 
   (0.927)  (2.193)        (1.926)  (1.574) 
GDP  Per  Capita  0.3094 0.3144 0.3260 0.2836 0.2525 0.2431 
(3.827) (4.408) (3.935) (5.325) (3.102) (4.421) 
Population Density  0.0534  0.0345 0.0766 0.0658 0.0096 0.0152 
    (1.365) (1.052) (2.783) (2.724) (0.303) (0.461) 
%  Electricity  from  Coal  0.0447 0.0579 0.0375 0.0477 0.0496 0.0385 
(1.123) (1.700) (0.993) (1.653) (1.258) (1.271) 
Coal Production Per Capita  -0.1545  -0.1165 -0.1259 -0.0608 -0.1549 -0.1050 
(-1.913) (-1.531) (-1.859) (-3.994) (-1.787) (-1.386) 
Lignite Production Per 
Capita  
0.0529 0.0450 0.0535 0.0452 0.0476 0.0402 
(2.303) (2.312) (2.655) (5.156) (1.804) (1.881) 
Election  Year  -17.080 -15.554 -18.569 -15.952 -17.614 -16.679 
(-23.91) (-21.74) (-22.60) (-20.58) (-29.23) (-25.19) 
Political Rights  0.0959  0.2396 0.1140 0.2277 -0.0684 0.1184 
(0.375) (1.136) (0.423) (0.939) (-0.298) (0.505) 
Liberal  -0.6475 -0.4549 -0.9328 -0.8488 -0.4823 -0.5328 
(-0.898) (-0.589) (-1.616) (-1.135) (-0.724) (-0.703) 
Conservative  -0.5445 -0.6872 -0.7546 -1.2109 -0.7124 -0.6425 
    (-0.840) (-0.798) (-1.188) (-1.468) (-1.098) (-0.783) 
Eastern  Europe 1.607 1.437 1.915 
    (2.141)    (2.110)    (2.255)    
Constant  1.302 -16.901 4.108 -11.905 -9.070 -7.348 
    (0.209) (-3.495) (0.979) (-3.663) (-2.169) (-2.456) 
Duration  dependence  1.8982 1.8204 1.8661 1.7151 1.8955 1.8067 
    (9.062) (7.731) (8.689) (7.087) (9.204) (8.291) 
N  390 327 390 327 390 327 
log-likelihood  -3.408 -5.817 -3.807 -7.396 -5.327 -7.464 
chi2  1360.76 1291.35 1169.34  943.91  1434.90 1399.00 
aic  38.82 41.63 37.61 42.79 40.65 42.93 
 
The table presents regression results the Weibull baseline hazard;  t-stats in parentheses. 38 
Table 4 – SO2 Regression Results: Sensitivity to Alternative Specifications  
 
Variable Weibull    Exponential    Gompertz    Cox 
Knowledge Stock  -0.0018  0.0795  0.0882 
   (-0.064)     (4.623)     (4.870)       
Knowledge x TPOI  -0.0012 -0.0012  -0.0013 0.0007  -0.0013 0.0001  -0.0009 
(-3.009) (-3.725)  (-3.901) (2.961) (-3.964)  (0.276) (-2.254) 
TPOI   0.2608  0.2648  0.2646  -0.1219 0.2587  0.0156 0.1834 
(3.361) (3.541)  (4.281) (-1.943)  (4.168) (0.300)  (2.054) 
World Export Share  0.3452  0.3465  0.3075 0.1901  0.2888 0.2642  0.2071 
    (2.193) (2.193)  (2.024) (1.053)  (1.969) (1.388)  (2.168) 
GDP  Per  Capita  0.3144 0.3160  0.2920 0.1697  0.2901 0.1947  0.2873 
(4.408) (4.423)  (5.496) (4.932)  (5.632) (4.637)  (4.334) 
Population Density  0.0345  0.0349  0.0333 -0.0091  0.0320 0.0045  0.0299 
    (1.052) (1.085)  (1.019) (-0.271)  (1.019) (0.130)  (1.016) 
% Electricity from 
Coal 
0.0579 0.0585  0.0654 0.0314  0.0640 0.0376  0.0365 
(1.700) (1.870)  (2.260) (1.484)  (2.306) (1.626)  (1.353) 
Coal Production Per 
Capita 
-0.1165 -0.1168  -0.1187 -0.1043  -0.1095 -0.1168  -0.0616 
(-1.531) (-1.518)  (-1.506) (-1.408)  (-1.474) (-1.358)  (-3.271) 
Lignite Production 
Per Capita  
0.0450 0.0452  0.0435 0.0314  0.0421 0.0332  0.0394 
(2.312) (2.281)  (2.329) (1.380)  (2.478) (1.180)  (3.296) 
Election  Year  -15.554 -16.377  -14.515 -16.135  -15.334 -15.371 
(-21.74) (-26.06)  (-23.24) (-36.93)  (-23.82) (-30.74) 
Political Rights  0.2396  0.2439  0.2726 0.0228  0.2916 0.0247  0.4029 
(1.136) (1.143)  (1.460) (0.114)  (1.598) (0.112)  (2.236) 
Liberal -0.4549  -0.4479  -0.2432  -0.6749 -0.2418  -0.6583 -0.1128 
(-0.589) (-0.609)  (-0.342) (-0.961)  (-0.350) (-0.927)  (-0.186) 
Conservative  -0.6872 -0.6831  -0.3090 0.0358  -0.2837 -0.2184  -0.3213 
   (-0.798)  (-0.799)  (-0.349)  (0.048) (-0.323)  (-0.289) (-0.382) 
Constant  -16.901  -17.129  -19.118 -3.597  -19.830 -5.660 
    (-3.495) (-4.382)  (-4.828) (-2.316)  (-5.489) (-3.061)     
Duration 
dependence  
1.8204 1.8117  -0.0842 0.1938 
(7.731)  (9.948)        (-0.710)  (3.084)    
N  327 327  327 327  327 327  327 
log-likelihood -5.817  -5.818  -10.092 -16.806  -9.973  -15.273  -34.044 
chi2  1291.35 1420.39  1583.92 1775.60  1747.71 1313.06  84.00 
aic  41.63 39.64    48.18 59.61    49.95 58.55    90.09 
 
The table presents regression results using alternative baseline hazards;  t-stats in parentheses. 39 
Table 5 – Regression Results: Weibull Results for Alternative Technologies 
 
 
Variable  SO2    NOX: Any Reg    NOX: Stringent 
Knowledge  Stock  -0.0893 -0.0018  -0.0258 -0.0253  -0.0044 -0.0139 
   (-2.499) (-0.064)  (-2.455) (-2.028)  (-0.477) (-0.997) 
Knowledge x Import Share  0.0016  0.0004  -0.0002 
(1.849) (2.198)  (-0.708) 
Import Share  -0.3554  -0.1095  0.0163 
   (-1.885)     (-2.043)     (0.249)    
Knowledge x Trade Policy 
Orientation Index 
-0.0012 0.0002 0.0000 
(-3.009) (0.451) (-0.164) 
Trade Policy Orientation 
Index  
0.2608 -0.0613 0.0485 
   (3.361)     (-0.695)     (0.815) 
World Export Share  0.1618  0.3452  0.0709 -0.0095  -0.0022 0.0894 
   (0.927)  (2.193)  (0.398)  (-0.055)  (-0.017)  (1.237) 
GDP  Per  Capita  0.3094 0.3144  0.2104 0.2090  0.2935 0.3399 
(3.827) (4.408)  (2.497) (2.783)  (3.880) (5.571) 
Population Density  0.0534  0.0345 0.0806  0.0563 0.0545  0.0538 
    (1.365) (1.052)  (2.747) (1.828)  (1.659) (1.606) 
% Electricity from Coal  0.0447  0.0579 0.0385  0.0333  -0.0313  -0.0293 
(1.123) (1.700)  (0.650) (0.595)  (-1.041)  (-1.088) 
Coal Production Per Capita  -0.1545  -0.1165 -0.0561  -0.0120 -0.0146  -0.0123 
(-1.913) (-1.531)  (-1.091) (-0.285)  (-1.269) (-1.246) 
Lignite Production Per 
Capita  
0.0529 0.0450  0.0452 0.0404  0.0241 0.0374 
(2.303) (2.312)  (3.619) (3.882)  (1.011) (2.494) 
Election  Year  -17.080 -15.554  -18.879 -17.135  -16.144 -15.255 
(-23.90) (-21.74)  (-28.34) (-31.77)  (-20.93) (-24.97) 
Political Rights  0.0959  0.2396 0.0990  0.4292  -0.0265  0.6692 
(0.375) (1.136)  (0.535) (1.916)  (-0.087) (1.354) 
Liberal -0.6475  -0.4549  -0.7493 -0.9087  -2.2733 -2.0885 
(-0.898) (-0.589)  (-1.423) (-1.633)  (-2.789) (-1.905) 
Conservative  -0.5445 -0.6872  -0.6917 -1.1804  -2.0196 -1.9066 
    (-0.840) (-0.798)  (-0.969) (-1.309)  (-2.735) (-2.057) 
Eastern Europe  (1.607)  (0.275)  (4.422) 
   (2.141)     (0.336)     (2.902)    
Constant 1.301  -16.901  -9.627  -10.509  -8.608  -10.420 
   (0.209)  (-3.495)  (-2.737)  (-3.003)  (-3.118)  (-4.428) 
Duration  dependence  1.8982 1.8204  1.8407 1.9109  1.2745 1.3287 
    (9.062) (7.731)  (6.897) (8.716)  (5.141) (4.178) 
N  390 327  380 317  618 542 
log-likelihood -3.408  -5.817  -3.067  -2.935  -12.337  -9.867 
chi2  1360.76 1291.35  3898.39 5266.31  741.31  1372.90 
aic  38.82 41.63    38.13 35.87    56.67 49.73 
 
The table presents regression results for alternative regulations, using the Weibull baseline 
hazard; t-stats in parentheses. 40 
Figure 1 – Adoption of Environmental Regulations over Time 
 




































































































































The figures show the cumulative percentage of countries that have adopted each regulation by 
the year on the x-axis.  In each case, note the S-shaped diffusion pattern that is typical for studies 
of technology adoption.  Note also that adoption of stringent NOX regulations has, to date, 
leveled off with fewer countries adopting than for the other regulations. 42 













1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Priority year
SO2 NOX Post Combustion NOX Combustion Modification
 
 
The figure shows patents granted in the U.S. with at least one foreign patent family member for 
each of three pollution control technologies. 
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NOX Combustion Modification NOX Post-Combustion Treatment SO2  
 
The figure shows the value of the knowledge stocks constructed for this paper for each of the 
three technologies.  Note that the value of the stock for SO2 progresses rather smoothly through 
time, whereas both NOX technologies experience periods of growth after major environmental 
regulations. 44 












































1980 Adopt 1980-2000 Never adopt
 
The figure shows the per capita GDP (in constant 1995 U.S. dollars) of each country in the year 
in which it adopts SO2 regulations for coal-fired power plants.  Countries are sorted from left to 
right along the x-axis by the order in which regulations were enacted.  The first two countries, 
Japan and the U.S., enacted regulations in 1970.  Three groups are presented.  The first six 
countries adopted regulations before 1980, and are thus not included in the regressions that 
follow.  The last eight countries never adopt regulation.  With the exception of Australia and 
New Zealand, who have stocks of relatively clean coal, these are all low income countries.  The 
remaining countries adopt during the time frame used in the regression for SO2 (1980-2000). 45 












































1980 Adopt 1980-2000 Never adopt
 
The figure shows the per capita GDP (in constant 1995 U.S. dollars) of each country in the year 
in which it adopts NOX regulations for coal-fired power plants.  Countries are sorted from left to 
right along the x-axis by the order in which regulations were enacted.  The first two countries, 
Japan and the U.S., enacted regulations in 1970.  Three groups are presented.  The first six 
countries adopted regulations before 1980, and are thus not included in the regressions that 
follow.  The last six countries never adopt regulation.  With the exception of New Zealand, who 
has a stock of relatively clean coal, these are all low income countries.  The remaining countries 
adopt during the time frame used in the regression for NOX (1980-2000). 
 46 










































) Adopt 1980-2000 Never adopt Adopt 1980-2000 Never adopt
 
The figure shows the per capita GDP (in constant 1995 U.S. dollars) of each country in the year 
in which it adopts stringent NOX regulations for coal-fired power plants.  Countries are sorted 
from left to right along the x-axis by the order in which regulations were enacted.  Two groups 
are presented.  Those on the left are countries that adopt stringent NOX regulations between 1980 
and 2000.  Germany, the first country to adopt stringent NOX regulations, did so in 1983.  Those 
countries on the right have not adopted stringent NOX regulations as of 2000. A1 
Appendix A – Theoretical Model and Solutions 
  The model we use to understand the effect of emissions regulations is a version of the 
Ricardo-Viner (RV) model.  The RV model posits perfect intersectoral mobility of labor but 
sector-specific capital.  In this way, it captures the short-run interests of capital owners who 
expend a portion of their production surplus to influence economic policy. 
i. Equilibrium Conditions 
  We consider an economy with four production sectors with technology described in the 
text: agriculture (A), Manufacturing (M), Electricity Generation (E), and Coal Mining (C).  
Agricultural and manufacturing goods are traded internationally.  Equilibrium in the labor 
market requires that labor supply equal the sum of labor demand:  . AMEC LL L L L =+++  
Agriculture serves as numeraire and labor productivity is unity, tying the wage at unity.  Profit 
maximization requires that the value marginal product of labor equal the wage in each sector: 
()1 ; ()1 ; ()1 .
NN
CC C E E E M M M Pf L P f L P f L ′′′ == =  
Net prices to manufacturing and electricity producers, ,
N
j P differ from market prices,  , j P  
because of intermediate inputs, as defined in the text.  The manufacturing sector uses one unit of 
electricity for each unit produced, implying that in equilibrium,E M = .  Electricity production 
requires one unit of coal for each unit of energy generated, implying that emissions are 
proportional to electricity generation.  Power plants must abate A percent of emissions, with 
these services purchased internationally at the fixed price, A P .   
  Firms’ ability to raise prices is limited by the elasticity of demand.  If the country pursues 
free trade or uses a tariff only, the relevant elasticity reflects the slope of the world excess 
demand curve, while if the country is small and uses a binding quota, the relevant elasticity 
reflects the slope of the domestic excess demand curve.  We denote excess demand by A2 
() MM X P and interpret this as excess world or excess domestic demand, depending on the case.   
In equilibrium, domestic supply must equal excess demand,  ( ) M M M XP = . Denoting the price 
elasticity of excess demand by  ( / )( / ) 0, MM M M M XP P X ε =−∂ ∂ ≥   and using the equilibrium 
condition,  ˆˆ . M M M P ε =−  
 ii. Comparative-Statics Solutions 
We use comparative statics to show how changes in exogenous variables affect 
equilibrium prices, outputs and profits.  We totally differentiate the equilibrium conditions of the 
model and express the effects on endogenous variables as a percentage change.   
Stricter Abatement Standard 
 The percentage change in the share of emissions that must be abated is ˆ A.  We define the 
elasticity of output with respect to labor in sector j as  , j η the (negative of the) elasticity of the 
marginal product of labor with respect to labor in sector j  as  j σ .  Input cost shares are 
/,
N
MM M M PP θ = /,
N
EE E E PP θ = /,
N
AE A E PA P θ = /,
N
EM E M PP θ = /
N
CE C E PP θ = .  Finally, we define 
the parameter () ()
1 0
M CEE E E MM M ME M EC CEC E ψ ηηθ σ ε η θ η θ ση σηθ
− =+ + + > .  This parameter is 
larger the more inelastic is excess demand. Using these terms, we can express the effect of a 
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Thus, tightening the standard lowers net producer prices.  The extent to which total profits for the 









=+ + <  
 where we have used (A.1) to sign the derivative.  Regardless of the extent to which producers 
are able to pass through regulatory compliance costs to consumers, profits cannot rise when the 
standard is tightened. 
  The effect of increased abatement on pollution depends on how electricity generation 
responds.  We find that a stricter mandate reduces manufacturing and electricity generation: 
(A.3)  ˆ 0. ˆ














ˆ 0. ˆ M









=− = ≥ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 
The price increase is larger the more inelastic is excess demand.  It can be shown that  ˆ ˆ
M PA < .   
  Larger Coal Reserves 
  In the text we note that larger coal reserves imply a larger manufacturing sector and 
higher emissions, ceteris paribus.  Here we provide the proof of this assertion for the case of 
non-traded coal.  Totally differentiating our model and solving yields: 
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where 0 C ν > is the marginal physical product of capital in the coal sector. B1 
Appendix B – European Classifications (ECLA) for Pollution Control Patents 
 
I. Nitrogen Dioxide pollution control 
Combustion Modification 
F23C 6/04B  MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; 
WEAPONS; BLASTING ENGINES OR PUMPS/COMBUSTION 
APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES/COMBUSTION 
APPARATUS USING FLUENT FUEL/Combustion apparatus 
characterised by the combination of two or more combustion 
chambers/in series connection/[N: with staged combustion in a single 
enclosure] 
F23C 6/04B1  MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; 
WEAPONS; BLASTING ENGINES OR PUMPS/COMBUSTION 
APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES/COMBUSTION 
APPARATUS USING FLUENT FUEL/Combustion apparatus 
characterised by the combination of two or more combustion 
chambers/in series connection/[N: with staged combustion in a single 
enclosure]/ [N: with fuel supply in stages] 
F23C 9  MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; 
WEAPONS; BLASTING ENGINES OR PUMPS/COMBUSTION 
APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES/COMBUSTION 
APPARATUS USING FLUENT FUEL/Combustion apparatus with 




B01D 53/56  PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING/ PHYSICAL OR 
CHEMICAL PROCESSES OR APPARATUS IN GENERAL/ 
SEPARATION/ Separation of gases or vapours; Recovering vapours 
of volatile solvents from gases; Chemical or biological purification of 
waste gases, e.g. engine exhaust gases, smoke, fumes, flue gases, 
aerosols/Chemical or biological purification of waste gases/Removing 
components of defined structure/Nitrogen compounds/Nitrogen oxides 
B01D 53/56D  PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING/ PHYSICAL OR 
CHEMICAL PROCESSES OR APPARATUS IN GENERAL/ 
SEPARATION/ Separation of gases or vapours; Recovering vapours 
of volatile solvents from gases; Chemical or biological purification of 
waste gases, e.g. engine exhaust gases, smoke, fumes, flue gases, 
aerosols/Chemical or biological purification of waste gases/Removing 
components of defined structure/Nitrogen compounds/Nitrogen 
oxides/[N: by treating the gases with solids] 
 B2 
B01D 53/60  PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING/ PHYSICAL OR 
CHEMICAL PROCESSES OR APPARATUS IN GENERAL/ 
SEPARATION/ Separation of gases or vapours; Recovering vapours 
of volatile solvents from gases; Chemical or biological purification of 
waste gases, e.g. engine exhaust gases, smoke, fumes, flue gases, 
aerosols/Chemical or biological purification of waste gases/Removing 
components of defined structure/Simultaneously removing sulfur 
oxides and nitrogen oxides 
B01D 53/86F2  PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING/ PHYSICAL OR 
CHEMICAL PROCESSES OR APPARATUS IN GENERAL/ 
SEPARATION/ Separation of gases or vapours; Recovering vapours 
of volatile solvents from gases; Chemical or biological purification of 
waste gases, e.g. engine exhaust gases, smoke, fumes, flue gases, 
aerosols/Chemical or biological purification of waste gases/General 
processes for purification of waste gases; Apparatus or devices 
specially adapted therefore/Catalytic processes/ N: Removing nitrogen 
compounds]/[N: Nitrogen oxides]/ 
B01D 53/86F2C  PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING/ PHYSICAL OR 
CHEMICAL PROCESSES OR APPARATUS IN GENERAL/ 
SEPARATION/ Separation of gases or vapours; Recovering vapours 
of volatile solvents from gases; Chemical or biological purification of 
waste gases, e.g. engine exhaust gases, smoke, fumes, flue gases, 
aerosols/Chemical or biological purification of waste gases/General 
processes for purification of waste gases; Apparatus or devices 
specially adapted therefore/Catalytic processes/ N: Removing nitrogen 
compounds]/[N: Nitrogen oxides]/[N: Processes characterised by a 
specific catalyst] 
B01D 53/86F2D  PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING/ PHYSICAL OR 
CHEMICAL PROCESSES OR APPARATUS IN GENERAL/ 
SEPARATION/ Separation of gases or vapours; Recovering vapours 
of volatile solvents from gases; Chemical or biological purification of 
waste gases, e.g. engine exhaust gases, smoke, fumes, flue gases, 
aerosols/Chemical or biological purification of waste gases/General 
processes for purification of waste gases; Apparatus or devices 
specially adapted therefore/Catalytic processes/ N: Removing nitrogen 
compounds]/[N: Nitrogen oxides [N: Processes characterised by a 
specific device] 
B01D 53/86G  PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING/ PHYSICAL OR 
CHEMICAL PROCESSES OR APPARATUS IN GENERAL/ 
SEPARATION/ Separation of gases or vapours; Recovering vapours 
of volatile solvents from gases; Chemical or biological purification of 
waste gases, e.g. engine exhaust gases, smoke, fumes, flue gases, 
aerosols/Chemical or biological purification of waste gases/General 
processes for purification of waste gases; Apparatus or devices 
specially adapted therefore/Catalytic processes/ [N: Simultaneously 
removing sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides] B3 
B01J 29/06D2E  PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING/ PHYSICAL OR 
CHEMICAL PROCESSES OR APPARATUS IN GENERAL/ 
CHEMICAL OR PHYSICAL PROCESSES, e.g. CATALYSIS, 
COLLOID CHEMISTRY; THEIR RELEVANT APPARATUS/ 
Catalysts comprising molecular sieves/ having base-exchange 
properties, e.g. crystalline zeolites/ Crystalline aluminosilicate 
zeolites; Isomorphous compounds thereof/ [N: containing metallic 
elements added to the zeolite]/ [N: containing iron group metals, noble 
metals or copper]/ [N: Iron group metals or copper] 
 
II. Sulfur Dioxide pollution control 
Sulfur dioxide pollution control techniques 
B01D 53/14H8  PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING/ PHYSICAL OR 
CHEMICAL PROCESSES OR APPARATUS IN GENERAL/ 
SEPARATION/ Separation of gases or vapours; Recovering vapours 
of volatile solvents from gases; Chemical or biological purification of 
waste gases, e.g. engine exhaust gases, smoke, fumes, flue gases, 
aerosols/ by absorption/ [N: Gases containing acid components]/ [N: 
containing only sulfur dioxide or sulfur trioxide] 
B01D 53/50  PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING/ PHYSICAL OR 
CHEMICAL PROCESSES OR APPARATUS IN GENERAL/ 
SEPARATION/ Separation of gases or vapours; Recovering vapours 
of volatile solvents from gases; Chemical or biological purification of 
waste gases, e.g. engine exhaust gases, smoke, fumes, flue gases, 
aerosols/Chemical or biological purification of waste gases/Removing 
components of defined structure/Sulfur compounds/Sulfur oxides 
Includes 50B, 50B2, 50B4, 50B6, 50C, 50D 
B01D 53/86B4  PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING/ PHYSICAL OR 
CHEMICAL PROCESSES OR APPARATUS IN GENERAL/ 
SEPARATION/ Separation of gases or vapours; Recovering vapours 
of volatile solvents from gases; Chemical or biological purification of 
waste gases, e.g. engine exhaust gases, smoke, fumes, flue gases, 
aerosols/Chemical or biological purification of waste gases/General 
processes for purification of waste gases; Apparatus or devices 
specially adapted therefore/Catalytic processes/ [N: Removing sulfur 
compounds]/ [N: Sulfur oxides] 
 
Fluidized bed combustion 
F23C 10  MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; 
WEAPONS; BLASTING ENGINES OR PUMPS/COMBUSTION 
APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES/COMBUSTION 
APPARATUS USING FLUENT FUEL/ Fluidised bed combustion 
apparatus C2 
Appendix C – U.S. vs. German Knowledge Stocks 
In this appendix, we examine the sensitivity of the results to the source of our patent data.  
Given that the U.S. was an early adopter of most regulations and that U.S. firms are a major 
source of abatement technology, our base specification uses patents granted in the U.S. 
Moreover, since we are focusing on patents with multiple family members, the U.S. is a logical 
choice in that its large market makes it a destination for many foreign patents. 
Nonetheless, in this appendix we present results using an alternative knowledge stock, on 
based on patents granted in Germany.  Again, we construct the stock using only those patents 
filed in multiple countries.  As shown in table C1, there are few changes.  Results for most 
explanatory variables are nearly identical when using the German knowledge stocks.  One 
notable exception is the interaction between knowledge and import shares for SO2.  This 
interaction is nearly zero when using the German stocks.  Unlike the U.S., Germany was not an 
early adopter of SO2 regulations, waiting until 1983 to first enact SO2 restrictions for coal-fired 
power plants.  Thus, as shown in Popp (2006a), Germany was not a major destination for SO2 
patents until the mid-1980s.   
Interestingly, while we might expect a similar effect for stringent NOX regulations, that 
does not appear to be the case.  In 1983, Germany was also the first country to pass stringent 
NOX regulations.  However, using the German knowledge stocks for stringent NOX regulations 
does not change the effect of knowledge.  The key difference is that, even though the U.S. did 
not have stringent NOX regulations at the time, many foreign firms chose to file relevant patents 
in the U.S. as well.  This can be seen in Figure 2 of the text, where NOX post-combustion patents 
increase dramatically in 1984.  Thus, the importance of the U.S. as a destination for foreign 
patents supports using U.S. patents as the basis for our knowledge stocks. C2 
Table C1 – Sensitivity to Alternative Country for Patent Stocks 
Variable
Knowledge Stock -0.0893 -0.0018 0.0073 0.0634 -0.0258 -0.0253 -0.0418 -0.0432 -0.0044 -0.0139 0.0067 0.0107
(-2.499) (-0.064) (0.297) (4.567) (-2.455) (-2.028) (-2.369) (-2.703) (-0.477) (-0.997) (0.491) (0.895)
Knowledge x Import Share 0.0016 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.00003
(1.849) (0.214) (2.198) (2.180) (-0.708) (-0.089)
Import Share -0.3554 -0.0676 -0.1095 -0.1633 0.0163 -0.0231
(-1.885) (-0.332) (-2.043) (-2.076) (0.249) (-0.243)
-0.0012 -0.0014 0.0002 0.0001 -0.00005 0.00002
(-3.009) (-3.745) (0.451) (0.363) (-0.164) (0.072)
Trade Policy Orientation Index 0.2608 0.3407 -0.0613 -0.0548 0.0485 0.0575
(3.361) (3.947) (-0.695) (-0.503) (0.815) (0.984)
World Export Share 0.1618 0.3452 0.3083 0.3055 0.0709 -0.0095 0.0696 0.0417 -0.0022 0.0894 -0.0045 0.1305
(0.927) (2.193) (1.598) (2.647) (0.398) (-0.055) (0.384) (0.227) (-0.017) (1.237) (-0.038) (2.157)
GDP Per Capita 0.3094 0.3144 0.3297 0.3799 0.2104 0.2090 0.2237 0.2227 0.2935 0.3399 0.3071 0.3896
(3.827) (4.408) (3.805) (5.085) (2.497) (2.783) (2.466) (2.818) (3.880) (5.571) (4.190) (5.135)
Population Density 0.0534 0.0345 0.0197 0.0241 0.0806 0.0563 0.0801 0.0491 0.0545 0.0538 0.0610 0.0664
(1.365) (1.052) (0.567) (0.808) (2.747) (1.828) (2.397) (1.442) (1.659) (1.606) (1.652) (2.176)
% Electricity from Coal 0.0447 0.0579 0.0587 0.0488 0.0385 0.0333 0.0446 0.0387 -0.0313 -0.0293 -0.0342 -0.0484
(1.123) (1.700) (1.500) (1.376) (0.650) (0.595) (0.769) (0.686) (-1.041) (-1.088) (-1.085) (-1.543)
Coal Production Per Capita -0.1545 -0.1165 -0.1561 -0.0864 -0.0561 -0.0120 -0.0550 -0.0144 -0.0146 -0.0123 -0.0147 -0.0144
(-1.913) (-1.531) (-1.838) (-2.239) (-1.091) (-0.285) (-1.170) (-0.359) (-1.269) (-1.246) (-1.324) (-1.364)
Lignite Production Per Capita 0.0529 0.0450 0.0531 0.0491 0.0452 0.0404 0.0428 0.0392 0.0241 0.0374 0.0267 0.0448
(2.303) (2.312) (2.501) (4.590) (3.619) (3.882) (3.809) (3.850) (1.011) (2.494) (1.273) (2.796)
Election Year -17.080 -15.554 -16.444 -16.065 -18.879 -17.135 -18.470 -17.755 -16.144 -15.255 -18.853 -15.900
(-23.90) (-21.74) (-18.32) (-22.23) (-28.34) (-31.77) (-31.85) (-30.61) (-20.93) (-24.97) (-22.69) (-31.40)
Political Rights 0.0959 0.2396 0.1237 0.4245 0.0990 0.4292 0.1051 0.4373 -0.0265 0.6692 0.1017 0.7731
(0.375) (1.136) (0.734) (2.207) (0.535) (1.916) (0.512) (1.864) (-0.087) (1.354) (0.389) (1.665)
Liberal -0.6475 -0.4549 -0.2850 -0.3420 -0.7493 -0.9087 -0.7319 -0.9653 -2.2733 -2.0885 -2.1842 -2.6443
(-0.898) (-0.589) (-0.511) (-0.522) (-1.423) (-1.633) (-1.365) (-1.755) (-2.789) (-1.905) (-3.055) (-2.338)
Conservative -0.5445 -0.6872 -0.2935 -0.2211 -0.6917 -1.1804 -0.6640 -1.1846 -2.0196 -1.9066 -1.9978 -2.2110
(-0.840) (-0.798) (-0.492) (-0.246) (-0.969) (-1.309) (-0.899) (-1.269) (-2.735) (-2.057) (-3.202) (-2.372)
Eastern Europe (1.607) (1.448) (0.275) (0.597) (4.422) (4.067)
(2.141) (1.766) (0.336) (0.713) (2.902) (2.831)
Constant 1.301 -16.901 -12.609 -23.972 -9.627 -10.509 -8.731 -12.169 -8.608 -10.420 -7.349 -10.505
(0.209) (-3.495) (-1.525) (-4.727) (-2.737) (-3.003) (-2.475) (-2.644) (-3.118) (-4.428) (-2.061) (-4.227)
Duration dependence 1.8982 1.8204 1.4390 1.1326 1.8407 1.9109 2.0724 2.2521 1.2745 1.3287 0.7484 0.3843
(9.062) (7.731) (4.883) (3.450) (6.897) (8.716) (6.926) (9.432) (5.141) (4.178) (3.030) (0.851)
N 390 327 390 327 380 317 380 317 618 542 618 542
log-likelihood -3.408 -5.817 -5.721 -4.820 -3.067 -2.935 -2.337 -1.857 -12.337 -9.867 -12.768 -10.134
chi2 1360.76 1291.35 815.21 1891.36 3898.39 5266.31 4694.45 4330.89 741.31 1372.90 828.50 3351.72
aic 38.82 41.63 43.44 39.64 38.13 35.87 36.67 33.71 56.67 49.73 57.54 50.27
Knowledge x Trade Policy 
Orientation Index
NOX: Any Reg NOX: Stringent SO2
US Germany US Germany US Germany
 
T-stats below estimates D1 
Appendix D – Knowledge Stock Sensitivity Analysis  
We examine the sensitivity of the regression results to changes in the rates of decay and 
diffusion used to calculate the knowledge stock.  In addition to the base rates of decay = 0.1 and 
diffusion = 0.25, we consider three alternative sets of rates.  To aid in interpreting these rates, we 
note the number of years it takes for a patent to have its maximum effect under each assumption 
set.  For comparison, patents have their maximum effect after 4 years using the base rates. 
•  decay = 0.25, diffuse = 0.5 (peak = 1 year) 
•  decay = 0.05, diffuse = 0.5 (peak = 4 years) 
•  decay = 0.05, diffuse = 0.1 (peak = 10 years) 
 
Tables D1 – D3 present regression results for each decay/diffusion combination for each 
of the three baseline hazards, using the Trade Policy Orientation Index.  Results are similar using 
import shares as our measure of trade policy, and are available from the authors upon request.  
Table D1 presents these results for adoption of SO2 regulation.  Table D2 presents results for NOX 
regulation, and table D3 for stringent NOX regulation.  As discussed in the text, estimation of the 
direct effect of knowledge is difficult, as it cannot be separately identified from any baseline 
hazard effects.  Thus, estimates of the direct effect vary across specification.  However, estimation 
of the interaction effect of knowledge and the openness variables is consistent both across 
decay/diffusion rate combinations and across baseline hazard specifications.  The one exception is 
for SO2 adoption with slow decay in the Weibull model (decay = 0.05).  Here, the interacted effect 
of knowledge and TPOI is insignificant
52.  However, the effect of knowledge with this 
specification occurs more slowly than is usually assumed in the technological change literature.  
Looking at other variables and at the NOX technologies, we also see few changes in the main 
results, suggesting our results are robust to the choice of decay and diffusion. 
                                                 
52 Alternatively, when using import shares, the interaction becomes positive and significant using a slow decay rate. D2 
Table D1 – Adoption of SO2 Regulations: Sensitivity to Decay Rates 
 


































Knowledge Stock 0.0795 0.1254 0.0570 0.0290 -0.0018 0.0925 -0.1345 -0.1434 0.0882 0.1235 0.0650 -0.0179
(4.623) (5.768) (4.463) (4.260) (-0.064) (3.247) (-2.861) (-3.660) (4.870) (4.868) (4.172) (-1.084)
-0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0004
(-3.901) (-2.397) (-3.696) (-3.255) (-3.009) (-2.178) (-1.003) (0.371) (-3.964) (-2.472) (-3.740) (-2.855) (-2.254) (-1.235) (-1.792) (-1.458)
Trade Policy Orientation Index 0.2646 0.2148 0.2095 0.1386 0.2608 0.2763 0.1285 -0.0549 0.2587 0.2993 0.2084 0.1327 0.1834 0.1715 0.1492 0.1118
(4.281) (2.369) (4.150) (3.727) (3.361) (2.216) (1.354) (-0.256) (4.168) (2.599) (4.113) (3.493) (2.054) (1.184) (1.652) (1.345)
World Export Share 0.3075 0.1962 0.3100 0.3017 0.3452 0.2516 0.3209 0.3734 0.2888 0.2383 0.2974 0.3376 0.2071 0.1768 0.2045 0.2044
(2.024) (1.906) (1.966) (1.865) (2.193) (2.195) (2.351) (1.456) (1.969) (2.128) (1.895) (1.902) (2.168) (1.785) (2.157) (2.185)
GDP Per Capita 0.2920 0.2694 0.2621 0.2190 0.3144 0.3315 0.2978 0.3819 0.2901 0.3060 0.2631 0.2046 0.2873 0.2707 0.2833 0.2813
(5.496) (5.803) (5.280) (5.076) (4.408) (5.025) (3.925) (4.112) (5.632) (5.329) (5.513) (4.457) (4.334) (4.289) (4.342) (4.338)
Population Density 0.0333 0.0033 0.0329 0.0305 0.0345 0.0138 0.0251 -0.0320 0.0320 0.0098 0.0326 0.0256 0.0299 0.0203 0.0297 0.0304
(1.019) (0.118) (0.989) (0.910) (1.052) (0.455) (0.743) (-0.627) (1.019) (0.332) (1.001) (0.711) (1.016) (0.683) (1.014) (1.037)
% Electricity from Coal 0.0654 0.0479 0.0648 0.0616 0.0579 0.0459 0.0419 0.0275 0.0640 0.0506 0.0646 0.0584 0.0365 0.0291 0.0362 0.0363
(2.260) (1.890) (2.459) (2.743) (1.700) (1.395) (1.376) (0.543) (2.306) (1.683) (2.499) (2.458) (1.353) (1.083) (1.351) (1.363)
Coal Production Per Capita -0.1187 -0.0657 -0.1260 -0.1272 -0.1165 -0.0828 -0.0832 -0.0627 -0.1095 -0.0800 -0.1200 -0.1373 -0.0616 -0.0586 -0.0614 -0.0616
(-1.506) (-3.011) (-1.496) (-1.468) (-1.531) (-2.177) (-1.898) (-2.568) (-1.474) (-2.372) (-1.442) (-1.452) (-3.271) (-3.294) (-3.256) (-3.228)
Lignite Production Per Capita 0.0435 0.0339 0.0413 0.0365 0.0450 0.0441 0.0395 0.0479 0.0421 0.0403 0.0406 0.0351 0.0394 0.0387 0.0390 0.0387
(2.329) (5.934) (1.880) (1.435) (2.312) (4.356) (3.551) (5.100) (2.478) (4.762) (1.984) (1.126) (3.296) (3.337) (3.287) (3.263)
Election Year -14.515 -15.204 -15.721 -15.200 -15.554 -15.772 -17.838 -14.111 -15.334 -16.841 -14.813 -15.093
-23.239 -21.713 -27.771 -28.598 -21.738 -22.164 -21.753 -16.587 -23.815 -23.935 -23.941 -22.448
Political Rights 0.2726 0.3433 0.2089 0.1384 0.2396 0.3041 0.2013 0.5986 0.2916 0.2954 0.2251 0.0617 0.4029 0.3530 0.3949 0.3922
(1.460) (1.884) (1.091) (0.707) (1.136) (1.598) (0.870) (2.020) (1.598) (1.561) (1.219) (0.265) (2.236) (2.034) (2.169) (2.115)
Liberal -0.243 -0.547 -0.338 -0.481 -0.455 -0.399 -0.885 -0.927 -0.242 -0.428 -0.320 -0.623 -0.113 -0.222 -0.120 -0.121
(-0.342) (-1.016) (-0.470) (-0.682) (-0.589) (-0.596) (-1.041) (-1.208) (-0.350) (-0.664) (-0.459) (-0.824) (-0.186) (-0.361) (-0.198) (-0.200)
Conservative -0.3090 -0.2463 -0.3922 -0.4608 -0.6872 -0.2229 -1.0525 -0.1291 -0.2837 -0.1671 -0.3719 -0.5576 -0.3213 -0.2884 -0.3388 -0.3586
(-0.349) (-0.333) (-0.460) (-0.564) (-0.798) (-0.262) (-1.036) (-0.114) (-0.323) (-0.206) (-0.437) (-0.692) (-0.382) (-0.345) (-0.406) (-0.433)
Constant -19.1180 -21.9469 -15.4686 -10.8258 -16.9006 -23.5840 -11.1304 -23.0969 -19.8302 -23.5336 -16.2342 -6.1782
(-4.828) (-5.571) (-4.665) (-4.556) (-3.495) (-4.450) (-2.592) (-2.516) (-5.489) (-4.892) (-5.401) (-2.685)
Duration dependence 1.8204 1.1655 2.7502 3.1984 -0.0842 0.1489 -0.0804 0.7050
(7.731) (4.112) (11.665) (13.707) (-0.710) (1.627) (-0.629) (2.816)
N 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327
log-likelihood -10.092 -8.001 -11.834 -14.247 -5.817 -5.654 0.576 7.600 -9.973 -7.047 -11.764 -12.639 -34.044 -34.444 -34.134 -34.166
chi2 1583.915 1867.539 1710.736 1478.017 1291.352 1777.513 1194.520 1159.447 1747.707 2040.908 1507.989 970.675 84.002 77.320 86.470 88.989
aic 48.184 44.001 51.669 56.493 41.634 41.308 28.849 14.799 49.946 44.094 53.527 55.278 90.088 90.888 90.269 90.331
t-statistics below estimates
Knowledge x Trade Policy Orientation 
IndexD3 
Table D2 – Adoption of NOX Regulations: Sensitivity to Decay Rates 
 


































Knowledge Stock 0.0136 0.0207 0.0128 0.0100 -0.0253 -0.0140 -0.0236 -0.0235 -0.0711 -0.0060 -0.0701 -0.0790
(2.393) (2.907) (2.521) (2.531) (-2.028) (-1.073) (-2.042) (-2.102) (-2.781) (-0.564) (-2.791) (-2.522)
-0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002
(-1.327) (-1.790) (-1.422) (-1.437) (0.451) (0.002) (0.425) (0.476) (0.742) (-0.747) (0.740) (0.857) (-0.781) (-1.278) (-0.854) (-0.786)
Trade Policy Orientation Index 0.0570 0.0769 0.0580 0.0528 -0.0613 -0.0084 -0.0593 -0.0695 -0.1058 0.0455 -0.1084 -0.1500 0.0156 0.0331 0.0189 0.0153
(1.559) (2.160) (1.640) (1.565) (-0.695) (-0.120) (-0.679) (-0.716) (-0.883) (0.955) (-0.885) (-0.964) (0.202) (0.532) (0.252) (0.199)
World Export Share 0.2330 0.2648 0.2344 0.2248 -0.0095 0.0327 -0.0081 -0.0072 -0.0712 0.1576 -0.0751 -0.0715 0.0199 0.0378 0.0224 0.0185
(2.202) (2.202) (2.227) (2.238) (-0.055) (0.256) (-0.046) (-0.039) (-0.418) (1.584) (-0.425) (-0.359) (0.170) (0.333) (0.193) (0.159)
GDP Per Capita 0.1441 0.1616 0.1465 0.1427 0.2090 0.2210 0.2095 0.2053 0.2110 0.1813 0.2132 0.2039 0.1836 0.1909 0.1847 0.1834
(3.649) (4.232) (3.705) (3.615) (2.783) (3.486) (2.762) (2.649) (3.014) (4.576) (2.952) (2.629) (3.661) (3.729) (3.675) (3.669)
Population Density 0.0286 0.0379 0.0300 0.0288 0.0563 0.0584 0.0564 0.0552 0.0601 0.0420 0.0607 0.0600 0.0726 0.0780 0.0735 0.0725
(1.069) (1.338) (1.122) (1.110) (1.828) (1.931) (1.822) (1.776) (2.052) (1.490) (2.055) (2.132) (2.280) (2.426) (2.310) (2.291)
% Electricity from Coal 0.0470 0.0496 0.0474 0.0476 0.0333 0.0337 0.0339 0.0338 0.0278 0.0351 0.0281 0.0283 0.0454 0.0512 0.0463 0.0452
(2.374) (2.215) (2.365) (2.468) (0.595) (0.729) (0.600) (0.580) (0.494) (1.183) (0.485) (0.423) (1.533) (1.773) (1.569) (1.526)
Coal Production Per Capita -0.1079 -0.1265 -0.1092 -0.1050 -0.0120 -0.0292 -0.0117 -0.0117 -0.0091 -0.0872 -0.0076 -0.0120 -0.0323 -0.0358 -0.0328 -0.0319
(-1.420) (-1.267) (-1.412) (-1.472) (-0.285) (-0.700) (-0.278) (-0.273) (-0.205) (-1.210) (-0.170) (-0.268) (-0.782) (-0.841) (-0.792) (-0.780)
Lignite Production Per Capita 0.0292 0.0348 0.0299 0.0289 0.0404 0.0397 0.0403 0.0407 0.0417 0.0369 0.0422 0.0455 0.0377 0.0379 0.0378 0.0378
(1.198) (1.090) (1.203) (1.262) (3.882) (3.932) (3.864) (3.791) (3.774) (1.707) (3.733) (3.291) (2.796) (2.750) (2.797) (2.811)
Election Year -15.0823 -14.4341 -15.0764 -15.0990 -17.1346 -17.7591 -16.8702 -17.6926 -18.3086 -16.1965 -19.4010 -16.8282
(-29.416) (-26.351) (-29.503) (-29.838) (-31.771) (-35.503) (-31.164) (-32.186) (-33.244) (-33.858) (-34.936) (-28.887)
Political Rights 0.0964 0.1111 0.0996 0.1037 0.4292 0.3594 0.4316 0.4236 0.5000 0.1814 0.5115 0.4624 0.3357 0.3584 0.3390 0.3352
(0.538) (0.597) (0.553) (0.584) (1.916) (1.675) (1.912) (1.856) (2.103) (0.893) (2.105) (1.949) (1.732) (1.822) (1.748) (1.738)
Liberal -0.737 -0.621 -0.732 -0.753 -0.909 -0.877 -0.920 -0.886 -0.969 -0.715 -1.007 -0.871 -0.158 -0.090 -0.150 -0.166
(-1.078) (-0.897) (-1.074) (-1.106) (-1.633) (-1.402) (-1.645) (-1.622) (-1.563) (-1.046) (-1.592) (-1.423) (-0.295) (-0.170) (-0.280) (-0.310)
Conservative -0.6401 -0.5830 -0.6483 -0.6674 -1.1804 -1.1891 -1.1922 -1.1452 -1.2399 -0.8048 -1.2765 -1.0643 -1.0445 -1.0608 -1.0481 -1.0455
(-0.879) (-0.793) (-0.889) (-0.919) (-1.309) (-1.367) (-1.313) (-1.262) (-1.267) (-1.021) (-1.280) (-1.118) (-1.422) (-1.432) (-1.427) (-1.428)
Constant -6.2063 -7.5837 -6.2449 -5.8621 -10.5093 -10.3516 -10.9468 -11.2173 -0.2848 -5.6261 -0.6283 0.3106
(-4.083) (-3.944) (-4.136) (-4.227) (-3.003) (-4.376) (-3.082) (-2.871) (-0.073) (-3.004) (-0.159) (0.064)
Duration dependence 1.9109 1.6724 1.9397 2.0028 1.4319 0.3910 1.5630 1.9369
(8.716) (9.230) (8.728) (8.718) (4.465) (3.450) (4.410) (3.687)
N 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317
log-likelihood -18.698 -16.884 -18.442 -18.690 -2.935 -5.996 -2.784 -1.975 -0.502 -12.319 0.276 3.270 -39.754 -39.451 -39.711 -39.756
chi2 1470.263 1392.189 1492.206 1494.090 5266.314 6079.087 5085.732 5425.181 6290.330 2671.893 6956.901 5785.787 76.050 78.289 76.746 76.480
aic 65.396 61.768 64.884 65.381 35.870 41.992 35.567 33.949 31.004 54.639 29.448 23.460 101.508 100.902 101.422 101.511
t-statistics below estimates
Knowledge x Trade Policy Orientation 
Index
 D4 
Table D3 – Adoption of Stringent NOX Regulations: Sensitivity to Decay Rates 
 


































Knowledge Stock 0.0117 0.0190 0.0098 0.0071 -0.0139 0.0089 -0.0255 -0.0354 0.0131 0.0191 0.0070 -0.0636
(2.135) (2.344) (1.975) (1.599) (-0.997) (0.481) (-1.529) (-1.919) (1.147) (1.866) (0.604) (-2.295)
-0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.000003 0.0007 -0.00002 -0.0001
(-0.892) (0.228) (-0.880) (-0.965) (-0.164) (0.412) (-0.136) (-0.317) (-0.935) (0.201) (-0.835) (-0.400) (0.007) (0.808) (-0.049) (-0.334)
Trade Policy Orientation Index 0.0915 0.0569 0.0906 0.0943 0.0485 -0.0047 0.0383 0.0523 0.0926 0.0575 0.0887 0.0615 0.1107 -0.0514 0.1157 0.1355
(2.033) (0.955) (1.991) (1.924) (0.815) (-0.028) (0.556) (0.498) (1.998) (0.953) (1.920) (0.695) (1.208) (-0.283) (1.279) (1.618)
World Export Share 0.1469 0.1542 0.1448 0.1439 0.0894 0.1314 0.0751 0.0586 0.1488 0.1543 0.1412 0.0971 0.2348 0.2200 0.2357 0.2400
(2.729) (2.900) (2.717) (2.689) (1.237) (2.062) (0.896) (0.459) (2.573) (2.965) (2.488) (1.184) (2.525) (2.270) (2.536) (2.571)
GDP Per Capita 0.3278 0.4348 0.3203 0.3006 0.3399 0.4440 0.3550 0.5140 0.3297 0.4346 0.3167 0.3157 0.7267 0.7597 0.7254 0.7199
(5.786) (4.572) (5.976) (6.251) (5.571) (4.468) (4.912) (3.035) (5.541) (4.585) (5.898) (4.632) (1.792) (1.672) (1.803) (1.851)
Population Density 0.0565 0.0790 0.0550 0.0507 0.0538 0.0768 0.0534 0.0830 0.0569 0.0791 0.0541 0.0415 0.1413 0.1423 0.1415 0.1426
(1.766) (2.709) (1.709) (1.554) (1.606) (2.557) (1.528) (1.831) (1.790) (2.693) (1.686) (1.105) (1.919) (1.767) (1.932) (1.983)
% Electricity from Coal -0.0247 -0.0643 -0.0219 -0.0124 -0.0293 -0.0685 -0.0293 -0.0480 -0.0252 -0.0642 -0.0208 -0.0162 -0.1187 -0.1293 -0.1182 -0.1161
(-0.947) (-1.875) (-0.867) (-0.521) (-1.088) (-1.899) (-1.022) (-1.304) (-0.934) (-1.869) (-0.807) (-0.552) (-1.201) (-1.145) (-1.207) (-1.231)
Coal Production Per Capita -0.0189 -0.0119 -0.0189 -0.0198 -0.0123 -0.0113 -0.0104 -0.0035 -0.0190 -0.0118 -0.0186 -0.0121 -0.0123 -0.0088 -0.0124 -0.0131
(-1.452) (-1.068) (-1.473) (-1.479) (-1.246) (-1.094) (-1.022) (-0.285) (-1.423) (-1.046) (-1.487) (-1.088) (-0.614) (-0.480) (-0.618) (-0.644)
Lignite Production Per Capita 0.0345 0.0526 0.0333 0.0298 0.0374 0.0535 0.0405 0.0658 0.0348 0.0526 0.0327 0.0359 0.0911 0.0936 0.0910 0.0905
(2.706) (2.787) (2.704) (2.661) (2.494) (2.780) (2.285) (2.179) (2.698) (2.790) (2.690) (2.053) (1.565) (1.468) (1.575) (1.615)
Election Year -14.9902 -15.7237 -15.2255 -14.5779 -15.2547 -16.5188 -16.0579 -15.1527 -16.4804 -16.5448 -15.8176 -15.6594
(-28.785) (-30.328) (-28.898) (-26.905) (-24.973) (-31.592) (-24.264) (-17.469) (-33.165) (-31.202) (-30.814) (-23.207)
Political Rights 0.4780 0.8923 0.4495 0.3517 0.6692 0.9576 0.7721 1.4017 0.4811 0.8914 0.4436 0.6608 1.8426 1.9809 1.8340 1.7934
(0.959) (1.823) (0.891) (0.658) (1.354) (2.043) (1.375) (1.654) (0.966) (1.855) (0.888) (1.037) (1.239) (1.232) (1.241) (1.249)
Liberal -2.402 -3.171 -2.339 -2.233 -2.089 -3.007 -2.127 -2.989 -2.435 -3.174 -2.280 -1.881 -4.629 -4.776 -4.621 -4.585
(-2.259) (-3.047) (-2.209) (-2.137) (-1.905) (-2.672) (-1.906) (-2.528) (-2.182) (-3.030) (-2.058) (-1.577) (-1.988) (-1.824) (-1.999) (-2.040)
Conservative -1.9210 -2.8491 -1.8640 -1.8029 -1.9066 -2.7095 -2.1587 -3.6638 -1.9593 -2.8542 -1.7992 -1.8815 -4.2242 -4.3725 -4.2211 -4.2131
(-2.306) (-3.278) (-2.228) (-2.102) (-2.057) (-2.800) (-2.034) (-2.236) (-2.116) (-3.217) (-1.944) (-1.553) (-2.249) (-2.117) (-2.260) (-2.307)
Constant -8.7548 -10.8984 -8.4417 -7.7553 -10.4197 -10.6116 -12.1625 -20.3600 -8.8779 -10.9064 -8.1972 -4.0325
(-4.484) (-3.854) (-4.526) (-4.403) (-4.428) (-2.879) (-4.696) (-2.970) (-4.144) (-3.839) (-4.041) (-1.081)
Duration dependence 1.3287 0.4738 1.7494 2.3373 -0.0169 -0.0019 0.0401 1.4694
(4.178) (1.225) (5.408) (6.238) (-0.127) (-0.027) (0.243) (2.903)
N 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542
log-likelihood -12.239 -9.368 -12.457 -13.107 -9.867 -8.903 -8.714 -4.509 -12.234 -9.368 -12.439 -7.511 -20.563 -20.361 -20.563 -20.547
chi2 1403.420 2480.548 1374.423 1147.671 1372.902 3216.914 1522.633 1372.034 2243.544 2895.016 1754.371 1548.240 82.794 70.432 83.343 85.827
aic 52.477 46.736 52.914 54.215 49.734 47.806 47.428 39.019 54.467 48.736 54.879 45.022 63.127 62.722 63.126 63.095
t-statistics below estimates
Knowledge x Trade Policy Orientation 
Index
 